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ABSTRACT—Adopted in 1793, the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) has come to 
symbolize the early republic’s concern with protecting state court 
autonomy from an overbearing federal judiciary. Modern observers view 
the AIA and its prohibition of injunctions to stay state court proceedings as 
an absolute barrier to federal interposition. All agree that the origins of the 
Act were, as the Supreme Court observed, “shrouded in obscurity.” 
To remove the shroud, we return to an eighteenth-century world in 
which separate courts of law and equity exercised concurrent jurisdiction, 
and courts of equity secured their role through injunctions to stay 
proceedings at law. One such proceeding unfolded in North Carolina, as 
founding financier Robert Morris attempted to stay the enforcement of an 
adverse state court judgment. The language of the AIA was likely drafted 
to address the specific problem of federal–state concurrency laid bare in 
that case, Morris v. Allen. By limiting its restriction to “writs of 
injunction,” the AIA barred original federal interposition but left the 
federal courts free to issue ancillary stays to protect federal jurisdiction and 
federal decrees. Reclaiming this lost distinction between original and 
ancillary injunctive relief calls for a fundamental reconsideration of the 
place of the 1793 Act in the legislative output of the early republic. Far 
from the absolute bar that it later became in the hands of twentieth-century 
jurists such as Felix Frankfurter, the 1793 Act struck a balance that 
protected state court autonomy even as it authorized federal judicial self-
defense. 
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While a variety of different themes crop up in historical treatments of 
the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 (AIA),1 scholars agree that the statute’s 
origins are “shrouded in obscurity” or “lost in the mists of history.”2 This 
narrative of historical obscurity informs the work of those, like Professor 
Charles Warren, who viewed the AIA’s declaration that no “writ of 
injunction” shall be issued to stay proceedings in state courts3 as a “firm 
bar” against federal court interference.4 Similar claims of obscurity animate 
the work of such historians as William Mayton and Wythe Holt, both of 
 
1 Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35. The modern AIA is codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2283 (2006). 
2 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1972) (footnote omitted) (“The precise 
origins of the legislation are shrouded in obscurity, but the consistent understanding has been that its 
basic purpose is to prevent ‘needless friction between state and federal courts.’” (quoting Okla. Packing 
Co. v. Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940))); 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4221 (3d ed. 2011) (footnote omitted) (“Why Congress [adopted the AIA] in 1793 is lost 
in the mists of history. There is no record of debate in Congress about it, and historians have only been 
able to speculate inconclusively about the motivation for the statute.”); Edgar Noble Durfee & Robert 
L. Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 
30 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1932) (“We know next to nothing of the parliamentary history of this 
statute.”); Telford Taylor & Everett I. Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in 
State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1170–72 (1933) (describing the history as a matter of “some 
uncertainty”). 
3 § 5, 1 Stat. at 335.  
4 Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 367 (1930) (“[T]he 
very explicit words of the statute have been considerably stretched by the Court so as to admit of 
implied exceptions, and substantial breaches have been made in this apparently firm bar against federal 
interference.”). 
108:187 (2014) The Lost History of the Anti-Injunction Act 
189 
whom regard the AIA as limiting only the power of a single circuit-riding 
Justice and as leaving the injunctive power of federal courts entirely intact.5 
The Supreme Court itself appears to have subscribed to the narrative of 
historical inaccessibility even as it continues to work out a complex body 
of law to govern the relations between state and federal courts.6 
The relatively thin historical record has left ample room for scholarly 
theorizing.7 Some view the AIA as the brainchild of its draftsman, 
Connecticut Senator (and future Chief Justice) Oliver Ellsworth, who was 
known for his general antipathy to equity.8 Others have linked the AIA to 
Edmund Randolph, the Attorney General whose lengthy 1790 Report 
proposed broad reforms to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and included a 
provision (or two) much like the AIA.9 But some scholars have dismissed 
the Randolph connection on two grounds: that Congress did not, as a 
general matter, take up his reforms, and that the particular provision that 
 
5 See Wythe Holt & James R. Perry, Writs and Rights, “Clashings and Animosities”: The First 
Confrontation Between Federal and State Jurisdictions, 7 LAW & HIST. REV. 89 (1989); William T. 
Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 332 (1978) 
(“Instead of erecting a bar applicable to all federal courts, Congress in 1793 seems to have enacted only 
a law prohibiting a single Justice of the Supreme Court from enjoining a state court proceeding.”); see 
also John Daniel Reaves & David S. Golden, Commentary, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute in the 
Aftermath of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 5 GA. L. REV. 294, 297–98 (1971). 
6 See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 232 (describing the origins of the Act as “shrouded in obscurity”). 
Nonetheless, the Court has drawn on the AIA in working out problems of federal–state concurrency. 
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (“Since the beginning of this country’s history 
Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free 
from interference by federal courts. . . . A comparison of the 1793 Act with 28 U.S.C. § 2283, its 
present-day successor, graphically illustrates how few and minor have been the exceptions granted from 
the flat, prohibitory language of the old Act.”). 
7 This dearth of legislative history is exacerbated by the fact that the Supreme Court did not decide 
a case in express reliance on the AIA until 1872. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 719–20 
(1872). Notably, the Court has sometimes treated its 1807 decision in Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. 
(4 Cranch) 179 (1807), as an early application of the AIA. See, e.g., Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 
U.S. 118, 134 & n.5 (1941); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849). 
8 See Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 (suggesting “that the inclusion of the injunction 
provisions [in the 1793 Act] was the result in part of then prevailing prejudices against equity 
jurisdiction” and observing that “Ellsworth had a pronounced dislike for chancery practice”); id. 
(observing that Ellsworth “at one time joined forces with anti-federalists in urging an amendment to the 
first Judiciary Act of 1789 which would have required that the facts in federal equity suits be found by a 
jury”); see also WILLIAM MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATE IN THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, IN 1789–90–91, at 94, 99 (George W. Harris ed., Harrisburg, Lane S. Hart Printer & Binder 
1880) (observing that, during debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, Ellsworth found himself opposing 
Morris—then a Senator from Pennsylvania—on that very topic: whereas Ellsworth was “generally . . . 
for limiting the chancery powers,” Morris “seemed almost disposed to join” members of the House who 
sought “to push the power of Chancery as far as possible”). 
9 See EDMUND RANDOLPH, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL TO THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES (DEC. 31, 1790) [hereinafter RANDOLPH’S REPORT], reprinted in 4 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 122, 127, 
162–63 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter DHSC]; Warren, supra note 4, at 347 (arguing 
that the AIA was “undoubtedly” adopted in consequence of Randolph’s Report). 
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some portray as a precursor to the AIA was part of a project (aimed at more 
completely separating the state and federal courts) that Congress chose not 
to implement.10 
An equally intriguing and problematic suggestion appears in the 
editorial notes of the indispensable Supreme Court Documentary History 
project.11 The editors of the project hypothesize that the AIA may have 
sought to calm the waters in the wake of a particularly controversial 
petition for certiorari in Morris v. Allen, a debt-related dispute between 
Founding Era banker Robert Morris and a group of North Carolina 
merchants. Morris sought to remove the case to federal court after what he 
viewed as a series of flawed state court proceedings—a litigation strategy 
that resulted in an early clash between the state and federal courts in North 
Carolina.12 But that hypothesis presents a puzzle: the Morris controversy 
arose from the use of certiorari to remove an action from state to federal 
court, posing the question why the drafters of the Act would ban the 
issuance of writs of injunctions to address the concern. As we will see, 
certiorari was a common law process that effected the removal of an action 
from an inferior to a superior court.13 A statute (like the AIA) that bars the 
federal courts from issuing writs of injunction to state courts would not 
foreclose issuance of writs of certiorari if otherwise appropriate, and it 
would not foreclose the use of a body attachment (contempt) as a mode of 
enforcing obedience to the certiorari. Nor would a ban on injunctions 
address the implication of state court inferiority embedded in the federal 
courts’ reliance on certiorari—reliance that helped to inflame passions in 
North Carolina following Morris.14 
Our examination of the AIA has revealed an important textual wrinkle 
that we think will clarify the meaning and purpose of the Act. As noted 
above, the AIA prohibited the issuance of “writs of injunction” to stay 
proceedings in state courts and seemingly brooks no exception.15 But when 
we view the Act’s reference to “writs of injunction” against the backdrop 
of practice in the Anglo-American Courts of Chancery, we find an 
important distinction between original and ancillary proceedings. Most 
suits brought in equity to stay proceedings at law were commenced through 
the submission of an original bill of injunction, which was served on the 
opposing party along with a subpoena, and which would (if successful) 
 
10 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122–27. 
11 See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 202 n.9. 
12 Among other important events, the materials offer a more detailed portrait of the controversial 
attempt of Morris, a prominent Pennsylvania merchant and financier, to remove litigation from state to 
federal court in North Carolina. See id.; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5. 
13 See Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and 
Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, 504 (1963). 
14 See Declaration of the Judges of the Superior Court of North Carolina (Nov. 19, 1790), in 2 
DHSC, supra note 9, at 111, 111–12 [hereinafter Declaration of North Carolina Judges]. 
15 See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335. 
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result in the issuance of a writ of injunction against further proceedings.16 
In addition to these original actions for writs of injunction, courts of equity 
also entertained motions or petitions for the issuance of ancillary relief in 
the nature of an injunction to protect their jurisdiction and ensure the 
effectiveness of their decrees.17 From Chancery’s perspective, the original 
bill for a writ of injunction initiated an action and brought parties before the 
court with proper notice through service.18 The ancillary injunction on 
motion, by contrast, operated on those who were already parties to an 
equitable proceeding and were subject to equitable control.19 We think the 
AIA was drafted to pick up this distinction, barring only original 
applications for the “writ of injunction” but leaving federal courts of equity 
free to grant ancillary relief, including injunctive relief, against state court 
proceedings that threatened prior federal litigation. 
We tell the story of the AIA in three parts. Part I briefly summarizes 
scholarly assessments of the Act’s origins. Part II focuses on the Morris 
case, using that litigation as a window into the distant and yet somewhat 
familiar world of eighteenth-century litigation. Part II also explores the 
strategic challenges that confronted the lawyers for Robert Morris as they 
tried to steer the case into a federal forum, and it recounts the reaction of 
the state court to the federal certiorari. Part III closely examines the 
language of the AIA in light of the equitable distinction between original 
bills for writs of injunction and ancillary proceedings to effectuate a decree. 
Part III also shows that the distinction helps to clarify most (but not all) 
confusing features of anti-suit injunctions in the nineteenth century. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
I. SETTING THE STAGE: ACCOUNTS OF THE AIA’S ORIGINS 
Scholarship on the Anti-Injunction Act nicely reflects the concerns of 
the day in which it was written (and tends to confirm a lasting truth about 
historically informed legal scholarship). Then-Professor Felix Frankfurter 
helped to inspire a growing interest in the statute at a time when 
 
16 See, e.g., Lecture LVI: Of Injunction Causes, in 3 RICHARD WOODDESSON, LECTURES ON THE 
LAW OF ENGLAND 158, 158 (W.R. Williams ed., Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1842) (footnotes omitted) 
(“Injunction causes are those, in which the bill prays, besides the writ of subpoena to compel the 
defendant to appear and answer, a writ also of injunction, inhibiting him from suing the complainant at 
common law . . . . For, generally, it is requisite, that he who seeks an injunction, should have a bill filed 
in court at the time. Yet in cases specially circumstanced, this has been dispensed with.”). 
17 See, e.g., Morrice v. Bank of Eng., (1736) 36 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ch.); 3 Swanst. App. 573; Cas. t. 
Talbot 217, 226; 2 Bro. P.C. (Toml. ed.) 465. 
18 See JOHN WYATT, THE PRACTICAL REGISTER IN CHANCERY 237 (London, A. Strahan 1800) 
(“No injunction for stay of suit at law shall be granted, revived, dissolved, or stayed, upon a petition, 
nor any injunction of any other nature pass by order upon petition, without notice and a copy of the 
petition first had by, or given to the other side . . . .”). 
19 See, e.g., Morrice, Cas. t. Talbot at 223 (suggesting that the Court viewed the power to grant an 
injunction against enforcement of judgments as essential to carry its jurisdiction into effect). 
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Progressive Era distrust of federal equity was at its height.20 Justice 
Frankfurter’s own 1941 opinion in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co. 
signaled an end to freewheeling federal court assertions of injunctive 
authority and invoked the Act’s origins in the course of inviting Congress 
to define the power of federal courts to enjoin state proceedings.21 By the 
1970s, students of federal jurisdiction argued for a broader federal judicial 
role in enforcing constitutional rights and offered a correspondingly 
narrower vision of the AIA.22 Echoes from the Warren Court’s expansion 
of equitable power to enforce civil rights continue to reverberate.23 
Beneath these broad patterns, one finds pockets of consensus as well 
as areas of disagreement. Perhaps the most widely accepted view is that we 
lack a detailed legislative history of the statute.24 This is due in large part to 
the fact that we cannot reconstruct the debates in either the House or the 
Senate.25 House debates in 1793 were only intermittently recorded, often by 
newspapers.26 Meanwhile, the Senate’s proceedings were closed to the 
 
20 See Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1169 n.† (dedicating their article to Professor Felix 
Frankfurter); cf. Warren, supra note 4, at 346 (noting that the “hasty” assumption of federal jurisdiction 
in challenges to the constitutionality of state laws had aroused “public antagonism” and led to demands 
on Congress to curtail federal jurisdiction). 
21 See 314 U.S. 118, 139, 141 (1941) (reversing an injunction issued to prevent relitigation in state 
court on the ground that the text of the AIA allowed for no judge-made exceptions). 
22 See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 5 (arguing that the Act applied only to the work of a single Justice 
riding the circuit and left lower federal courts free as courts to enjoin state proceedings). 
23 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 736 & n.5 (5th ed. 2007) (describing 
Mayton’s account as a persuasive showing); Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All 
Who Fear Their Influence on State Objects”: The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in 
the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 336–37 & n.145 (1987) (expressing 
agreement with Mayton’s view that the Act limited only the power of a single Justice). 
24 See Durfee & Sloss, supra note 2, at 1145 (“We know next to nothing of the parliamentary 
history of this statute.”); Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1170–72 (describing the history as a matter of 
“some uncertainty”); cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232 (1972) (describing the origins of the Act 
as “shrouded in obscurity”). 
25 See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2; Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1170 n.9 (“It is apparent 
from the Annals, however, that there was considerable debate which is not reported.” (citing 3 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 607, 645, 875, 882 (1792–1793))). 
26 See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 663 (1793) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The 
Senate have passed a bill, entitled An act in addition to the act, entitled An act to establish the Judicial 
Courts of the United States; to which they desire the concurrence of this House. . . . The bill sent from 
the Senate, entitled An act in addition to the act, entitled An act to establish the Judicial Courts of the 
United States, was read the first time.”); id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The House . . . 
resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled An act in 
addition to the act, entitled An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States; and, after some 
time spent therein, Mr. Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Steele reported that the committee had, 
according to order, had the said bill under consideration, and made several amendments thereto; which 
he delivered in at the Clerk’s table, where the same were severally twice read, and agreed to by the 
House. Ordered, That the said bill, with the amendments, do lie on the table.”). 
Records are available in the Annals of Congress, but they were compiled decades later using, for 
the most part, newspaper accounts. See Annals of Congress, LIBR. CONGRESS AM. MEMORY, http://
memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). 
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public, and the debates were not transcribed.27 No House or Senate report 
accompanied the measure, as it would today, and we therefore lack an 
official account of what the legislation was meant to achieve.28 
The absence of an official account has opened the way to a measure of 
scholarly speculation, more or less well-informed, about the likely origins 
and purpose of the AIA.29 Scholars generally agree that the Judiciary Act of 
1793 came about in response to President George Washington’s suggestion 
in November 1792 that Congress consider revisions to the judiciary 
system.30 Washington’s suggestion reflected concerns that the Justices had 
expressed about the burdens of circuit riding; he enclosed a 
“representation” from the Justices which described circuit riding as “too 
burthensome” and criticized the portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that 
called upon Justices to sit in review of decisions they had made as circuit 
judges.31 But the linkage to circuit-riding concerns may itself serve to 
obscure the Act’s purpose. Professor Mayton, for example, argued that the 
anti-injunction provision meant to qualify only the power of a single Justice 
on circuit, and thus left the injunctive power of “courts” fully intact.32 
The possible relevance of the Randolph Report also plays a recurrent 
but somewhat unsettled role in the scholarly debate.33 In August 1790, 
 
27 Senator Maclay’s journal, which gave “meaning and life to the journal record,” only covers the 
years 1789–1791 and so, with regard to post-1791 legislation like the AIA, “it is impossible to follow 
with any assurance of a right comprehension the votes and other officially recorded acts of any 
senator.” WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 208 (1905). 
28 See Mayton, supra note 5, at 336 (noting the absence of recorded debates); Taylor & Willis, 
supra note 2, at 1170 (same); see also 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 200–03 (recounting the legislative 
history of the Act from the evolution of drafts and contemporaneous correspondence). 
29 For example, Professor Warren speculated that the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), upholding the suability of states, may have offended the states and helped 
build support for limits on federal judicial power. See Warren, supra note 4, at 347–48. But Warren’s 
account has gained little traction in the literature. See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 5, at 335 n.35 (rejecting 
the linkage to Chisholm on the ground that the Senate draft of the Act preceded the Chisholm decision 
by several weeks). 
30 See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 201. 
31 See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 289–90 (reproducing a “representation,” dated August 9, 1792, 
from the Justices to Congress). By assigning individuals appointed as Justices of the Supreme Court the 
additional task of serving as circuit judges, the Act of 1789 created the possibility that actions taken by 
circuit-riding Justices would come before the full Court for further review. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75. Circuit riding had long been a painful duty for the Justices; their 
complaints dated from the summer after they concluded their first round. See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 
3–4 (editor’s note) (dating the Justices’ objections to the propriety of requiring the same individuals to 
serve as judges of both a supreme and inferior court to August 1790). The salary structure in place at 
the time may have complicated the task of according relief; the Justices’ salary had been set to cover the 
cost of travel associated with circuit riding and Congress could not, in keeping with Article III, reduce 
that salary if and when it chose to reduce the Justices’ circuit obligations. See James E. Pfander, 
Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 32–34 (2008). 
32 See Mayton, supra note 5, at 332–38. 
33 See infra Part III.A (discussing Randolph’s Report). 
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Congress asked Randolph, the nation’s first Attorney General, for a report 
on the federal judicial system.34 The fact that Randolph’s Report and the 
AIA both discuss writs of ne exeat and injunction in closely related 
provisions might explain why some scholars have seen a connection 
between the two.35 Others have been less sure that Randolph’s Report was a 
precursor to the AIA.36 Finally, scholars have put forward a range of views 
about the possible relevance of the Morris certiorari litigation.37 Scholars 
associated with the Documentary History project in particular have 
suggested that the Morris certiorari may have led, in some indirect way, to 
the adoption of the AIA.38 
These accounts all help to identify fruitful lines of inquiry but omit a 
crucial part of the story: the fact that courts of equity were generally free to 
relitigate matters decided by courts of law and to enjoin the parties from 
enforcing any judgments they had obtained previously. The Morris 
litigation presented this problem of federal equitable relitigation in sharp 
relief; the federal circuit court had issued a writ of certiorari to secure the 
removal of the action from state to federal court, but the relief sought in the 
removed action was an injunction against the enforcement of a previous 
state court judgment.39 In other words, Morris had invited the federal court 
to take over a state court proceeding in equity that had been brought to 
challenge on equitable grounds the merits of an action previously resolved 
by the state’s courts of law. We think, as we discuss in the next Part, that 
the AIA was meant to foreclose this particular form of federal equitable 
relitigation, avoiding the problem of bifurcated proceedings identified in 
Randolph’s Report. Morris v. Allen40 brought these issues to a head. 
 
34 See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 122 & n.2. 
35 See Warren, supra note 4, at 347 (declaring that the AIA was “undoubtedly” drafted in 
consequence to Randolph’s Report); see also infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the writ 
of ne exeat). 
36 Thus, Taylor and Willis described Randolph’s proposed amendment as “of much more limited 
scope . . . , inasmuch as it operated only upon the district courts, applied only to judgments at law . . . , 
and was merely procedural in purpose.” Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 n.14. Similarly, Wythe 
Holt acknowledges the similarity, but contends that Randolph’s provision was part of a larger scheme 
designed to separate the state and federal courts and immunize state court judgments from Supreme 
Court review. See Holt, supra note 23, at 336 n.145. 
37 For the view that the continuing availability of federal writs of certiorari highlights the 
narrowness of the AIA restriction, see Mayton, supra note 5, at 336 (citing Note, Federal Court Stays of 
State Court Proceedings: A Re-examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 612, 
620–23 (1971) (describing both the Morris certiorari and a similar writ issued to the South Carolina 
state court in Washington & Beresford v. Huger)). 
38 See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 202 n.9. 
39 See infra Part II.B–C. 
40 See Allen v. Morris & Nisbitt, Minute Docket, 1787 and 1795–1796, Chowan County Court of 
Pleas and Quarter Sessions, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (entries for Mar. 29, 1787 
and June 28, 1787), Chowan County [hereinafter Chowan County Minutes] (on file with authors).  
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II. MORRIS V. ALLEN: THE FIRST INTERJURISDICTIONAL CLASH 
The Morris certiorari case, Morris v. Allen, grew out of a long-
simmering dispute between Robert Morris, the “Financier of the American 
Revolution,”41 and a group of merchants in Edenton, North Carolina.42 The 
litigation,43 which has been the subject of a detailed and extremely helpful 
historical treatment,44 went through four phases. Each phase reveals 
something distinctive about the perceived failure of the state courts to 
provide an unbiased forum for disputes involving nonresidents and the 
difficulty of fashioning a federal judicial solution to that failure. The saga 
begins with what Morris regarded as a flawed state court proceeding.45 In 
the second phase, Morris sought relief from a state court of equity.46 In the 
third phase, Morris sought to shift his equitable proceeding to the newly 
created federal court system through certiorari,47 thereby triggering phase 
four: a national crisis in federal–state judicial relations. By situating the 
dispute in the complex world of late eighteenth-century commercial 
litigation, we hope to shed light on the meaning of the AIA. We start with a 
brief overview of the dispute. 
A. Phase One: Morris and the North Carolina Jury 
Robert Morris was a man of wealth and repute in the early republic.48 
He was Superintendent of Finance under the Articles of Confederation, one 
 
41 ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MORRIS: PATRIOT AND FINANCIER 1 (1903). 
42 See Chowan County Minutes, supra note 40. 
43 The legal battle that pitted Robert Morris and his Philadelphia associates David Conyngham 
(alternatively spelled “Cunningham”), Redmond Conyngham (or “Cunningham”), and John Nesbitt 
against Nathaniel Allen and a group of Edentonian merchants took on a variety of case names as it 
wound its way through the North Carolina state courts. For example, the original state court action at 
law was docketed under Allen v. Morris & Nisbitt and Allen v. Nesbit. See Chowan County Minutes, 
supra note 40. For simplicity and in the interest of remaining consistent with the DHSC’s manner of 
indexing this litigation, see generally DHSC, supra note 9, we refer to all of these proceedings in state 
and federal court as “Morris v. Allen.” 
44 See generally Holt & Perry, supra note 5 (examining the Morris dispute). We are indebted to 
Professor Holt and Mr. Perry for their meticulous archival research. 
45 See infra Part II.A. 
46 See infra Part II.B. 
47 See infra Part II.C. 
48 See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE 202–05, 207 (2002); JOHN R. VILE, 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A 
COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 218 (2005). Morris and his good friend, 
future Justice James Wilson, had speculated in land, and when the speculative bubble burst in the late 
1790s, both men found themselves in debtors’ prisons. See MANN, supra at 203, 207; William Ewald, 
James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 908 (2008). Morris 
bears the distinction of being (along with Wilson) one of two men to have signed the Declaration of 
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution. MICHAEL E. NEWTON, ANGRY 
MOBS AND FOUNDING FATHERS: THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77 (2011); 
see also VILE, supra, at 209; The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, ARCHIVES.GOV, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). Some 
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of Pennsylvania’s delegates to the constitutional convention, and later a 
U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania.49 During the 1780s, Morris found himself 
embroiled in a series of disputes with his former business associates in the 
North Carolina state courts. The suits involved creditors’ claims filed 
against Morris’s North Carolina assets—assets that had been managed by 
one Robert Smith.50 When Smith died suddenly in March 1782, executors 
were called upon to conduct an accounting of his disorderly estate.51 The 
first suit, filed by John Cooper in June 1782, alleged that Morris owed 
debts of £2800, but a “special” North Carolina jury comprised entirely of 
merchants awarded Cooper an amount more than triple the claimed debt.52 
James Iredell, one of the executors of the Smith estate,53 was surprised by 
the sum and observed that Morris’s attorney, future Senator Samuel 
Johnston, would “make a motion in arrest of Judgme[nt], conceiving the 
proceedings in the conduct of the suit to have been irregular.”54 The motion 
was discontinued and the parties settled in the spring of 1785.55 Morris’s 
decision to settle appears to have been prompted both by the difficulties of 
defending against an action in a distant court and by an expectation that, as 
an outsider, he would not get a fair shake in North Carolina state court.56 
 
historians regard Morris as having been “the most powerful man in America—aside, perhaps, from 
George Washington.” TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND 
THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 72 (2007); see also CHARLES RAPPLEYE, 
ROBERT MORRIS: FINANCIER OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4 (2010). 
49 OBERHOLTZER, supra note 41, at 58, 74. 
50 See generally Complaint at 252–84, Morris v. Allen, Record of the Pleadings and Decrees in the 
Court of Equity, Superior Court of Law and Equity for Edenton District, North Carolina Office of 
Archives and History (1788) [hereinafter Complaint, Morris] (on file with authors); Answer of 
Nathaniel Allen, John Maxwell Nesbitt, and David Hayfield Cunningham at 285–92, Morris v. Allen, 
Record of the Pleadings and Decrees in the Court of Equity, Superior Court of Law and Equity for 
Edenton District, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (1788) [hereinafter Answer, Morris] 
(on file with authors); Pleading of Josiah Collins and James Iredell at 293–98, Morris v. Allen, Record 
of the Pleadings and Decrees in the Court of Equity, Superior Court of Law and Equity for Edenton 
District, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (1788) [hereinafter Collins & Iredell Pleading, 
Morris] (on file with authors); see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 90–91. 
51 See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 112 n.6. 
52 Id. at 91, 113 n.8. 
53 Iredell, a North Carolina lawyer and Federalist, and later a Justice of the Supreme Court, found 
himself ensnared in the Morris affair as an executor of the Smith estate. See Letter from James Iredell, 
Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and William 
Cushing and James Wilson, Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court (Feb. 11, 1791), in 2 DHSC, supra 
note 9, at 131, 134. 
54 Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 113 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting a letter from Iredell to 
Conyngham, Nesbitt & Co. dated January 3, 1784). Iredell did not specify the nature of the 
irregularities. Id. at 91–92. 
55 Id. at 92. 
56 See id. at 92–93, 113 n.13 (quoting a letter to Morris from his attorney, Samuel Johnston, dated 
April 1, 1785, stating that “it would have been much against you to defend a Law Suit at so great a 
distance from home against an Adversary on the Spot ready to avail himself of every favorable 
occurrence”). Before settling the Cooper matter, Morris complained that he had been “the Subject of 
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The second suit arose from a shipping venture gone awry. Morris and 
three other Pennsylvanians held a one-third interest in the cargo vessels 
Hancock and Franklin; nine merchants from Edenton, North Carolina, held 
the remaining two-thirds interest.57 One of the Edentonians, Nathaniel 
Allen, was named “[s]hip’s husband,” with sole authority to give orders as 
to cargo contents and ports of call.58 Morris was concerned that the ships, 
which were based in Edenton, might be vulnerable to British attack because 
the port of Edenton was “particularly infested by Cruizers of the Enemy.”59 
Morris convinced Allen that the ships “might be sent upon voyages of 
much greater profit and safety” if they set sail from Philadelphia instead of 
Edenton.60 He maintained that Allen ordered the ships to rendezvous at 
Philadelphia, “to be placed under the care controul and management” of 
Morris.61 (Allen later claimed that he had “signified his disapprobation of 
that part of the plan which had in view the return of the vessels to the port 
of Philadelphia.”)62 In January 1782, both vessels set sail from Philadelphia 
for foreign ports with orders from Morris to return to Philadelphia.63 On the 
return voyage, British ships seized the fully laden Hancock; the Franklin’s 
captain, ostensibly fearing the same fate, disobeyed Morris’s orders and 
returned to Edenton instead.64 Armed with profits from the Franklin’s 
successful return, the Edentonians pursued Morris and his associates on the 
theory that, in contravening Allen’s instructions that both ships return to 
Edenton, Morris had caused the loss of the Hancock.65 
As luck would have it, Allen was also a North Carolina state court 
judge. Judge Allen and his fellow Edentonians brought their action against 
Morris and his Philadelphia business partners in 1786 in North Carolina’s 
Chowan County Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions—the same court in 
which Allen served as judge.66 In keeping with the vicinage rules of the 
day, Morris’s jury would have been composed of individuals drawn from 
 
abuse & misrepresentation in No. Carolina on Acct. of this affair.” Id. at 92, 113 n.12 (quoting a letter 
from Morris to John Williams, dated November 23, 1784). 
57 See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 252–53; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 90, 112 
n.4. 
58 Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 286; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 90. 
59 Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 255. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 287–88. 
63 See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 254–55; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 112 
n.5. 
64 Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 263–64; Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 112 n.5. 
65 Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 288–89; Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91. 
66 See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 93. Holt and Perry observe that although Judge Allen 
apparently did not sit on the days Morris’s case was heard, “it is reasonable to conclude that [Allen’s] 
fellow judges might favor the interests of the North Carolinian.” Id. at 93, 113 n.14 (citing Chowan 
County Minutes, supra note 40). 
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the local community.67 In June 1787, the Edentonians prevailed with a jury 
verdict of £2775,68 resulting in what we will sometimes call the Hancock 
judgment. At the time, Morris was in Philadelphia attending the 
Constitutional Convention as a representative of the state of Pennsylvania.69 
Based on his experience in North Carolina, Morris may well have 
supported the efforts of his fellow Pennsylvania delegate, James Wilson, to 
provide in Article III of the Constitution for a set of independent federal 
tribunals with diversity jurisdiction over disputes between locals and the 
citizens of another state.70 
 
67 Common law practice in the early republic adhered to the “vicinage principle,” wherein juries 
were “drawn from the immediate vicinity, or vicinage, of the area in which the cause of action arose” 
because “[o]nly a local jury . . . would be in a position to judge the credibility and motives of the parties 
and witnesses.” Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1003, 1070 (2007). 
Vicinage was of such importance that debates over its rejection arose in the ratifying conventions 
of several states, including North Carolina, with Antifederalists supporting vicinage. See id. at 1038, 
1073. Compare Joseph M’Dowall, Remarks at the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (July 28, 1788), in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 149–51 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS] (“Suppose 
a crime is committed at the Mississippi; the man may be tried at Edenton. They ought to be tried by the 
people of the vicinage; for when the trial is at such an immense distance, the principal privilege 
attending the trial by jury is taken away; therefore the trial ought to be limited to a district or certain 
part of the state.”), with Governor Samuel Johnston, Remarks at the Convention of the State of North 
Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 4 DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS, 
supra, at 150 (“We may expect less partiality when the trial is by strangers; and were I to be tried for 
my property or life, I would rather be tried by disinterested men, who were not biased, than by men who 
were perhaps intimate friends of my opponent.”). 
Moreover, as was customary, these local jurors would have wielded the power to decide issues of 
both law and fact subject to minimal bench control. See Jones, supra, at 1031; William E. Nelson, 
Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A Legal History of Colonial North Carolina, 1660–
1775, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2133, 2146 (2010) [hereinafter Nelson, Politicizing the Courts] (footnote 
omitted) (“Judges [in colonial North Carolina], even in chancery, always relied on juries to assess 
damages, and juries passed on legal issues, such as the validity of service of process, that were more 
appropriately raised with the court prior to trial.”). But see William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of 
Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1025 (2010) [hereinafter Nelson, Lawfinding Power] 
(finding that North Carolina judges exercised control over jury lawfinding). Professor Jones argues that 
diversity jurisdiction has its roots in the Framers’ “desire to circumvent state court juries” whose 
“almost unfettered power to decide legal controversies” constituted a “direct, and therefore dangerous, 
form[] of democracy.” Jones, supra, at 1003–04. 
68 See Trial, Appearance, and Reference Docket, Allen v. Morris & Nesbitt, Chowan County Court 
of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (entry for June 1787), 
Chowan County [hereinafter Chowan County Trial Docket] (on file with authors); see also Holt & 
Perry, supra note 5, at 92, 113 n.10. 
69 The records of the Convention report that Robert Morris attended as a delegate from 
Pennsylvania from the convention’s opening day in May 1787 to the date on which he added his 
signature to the document in September 1787. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 1 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); 2 id. at 664. 
70 See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 95; James Wilson, Remarks at the Convention of the State of 
Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 DEBATES IN THE STATE 
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B. Phase Two: Equitable Relitigation in State Court 
Again finding himself in North Carolina state court, Morris moved 
along two separate tracks to block enforcement of the Hancock judgment 
against him. First, he filed a petition for a writ of error with the North 
Carolina Superior Court of Law, seeking review of the jury’s verdict.71 
Second, and somewhat surprisingly to a modern observer, he filed a bill in 
equity seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the jury verdict.72 Today, in a 
court system where law and equity have merged, one would expect Morris 
to litigate all of his claims and defenses in the first proceeding, and then to 
seek direct review of the final judgment in an appellate court. Under the 
doctrine of claim preclusion, such a judgment would preclude a second or 
collateral round of litigation. By contrast, in the 1780s the English court 
system and many colonial and early state court systems in America 
separated the courts of law and equity and did not regard judgments at law 
as a bar to a second proceeding in equity; this absence of res judicata effect 
was the essence of a divided regime where courts of equity entertained 
claims and defenses unavailable in courts of law.73 As a result, litigants in 
 
CONVENTIONS, supra note 67, at 491–92 (“[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or 
private credit, that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to which they may 
resort? I would ask how a merchant must feel to have his property lie at the mercy of the laws of Rhode 
Island. I ask, further, How will a creditor feel who has his debts at the mercy of tender laws in other 
states?”). This stands in stark contrast to Judge Henry Friendly’s assertion that there is no evidence of 
state court bias to justify constitutional provisions for diversity jurisdiction. See Henry J. Friendly, The 
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 493 (1928) (“But such information as 
we are able to gather from the reporters entirely fails to show the existence of prejudice on the part of 
the state judges.”). 
Several years later, during a debate to repeal the Midnight Judges Act of 1801, Morris would ask 
his fellow Senators to “[e]xamine the annals of history” and “see what has been the ruin of every 
Republic”—“[t]he vile love of popularity.” He asked, “Why are we here? To save the people from their 
most dangerous enemy; to save them from themselves.” 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 41 (1802); see also 
Jones, supra note 67, at 1037 & n.186. 
71 See Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 288–89 (“[A]n attachment hath been levied on the monies 
of the Complainants [Morris et al.] in the hands of Robert Smith’s Executors, and . . . the same hath 
been removed by Appeal on the part of the Complainants to the Superior Court of Law for the said 
District, altho’ this Defendant [Nathaniel Allen] and the other Plaintiffs in the said suit have prevailed 
in two trials in the said County Court.”). 
72 See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50; Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 92, 113 n.11. 
73 See Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 332, 336 (1813) (“Without attempting to 
draw any precise line to which Courts of equity will advance, and which they cannot pass, in restraining 
parties from availing themselves of judgments obtained at law, it may safely be said that any fact which 
clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could 
not have availed himself in a Court of law; or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was 
prevented by fraud or accident unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will 
justify an application to a Court of Chancery.”); GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 
§ 380, at 331–32 (Joseph D. McCoy rev. ed., 11th ed. 1931); 1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 378, at 601–03 (2d ed. 1902); see also infra Part III.C. Similarly, a 
judgment in equity was not res judicata as to a proceeding at law. 28 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, 
§ 4410, at 253 (generally acknowledging the absence of res judicata effect as between law and equity as 
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complex or high-stakes disputes often conducted two rounds of litigation: 
one in the courts of law for breach of contract or other claims and a second 
proceeding in the court of equity to press claims of an equitable nature.74 
Morris’s invocation of equity after suffering an adverse ruling at law 
was hardly a novel strategy. Rules of equity dating back to Lord Coke’s 
feud with Chancellor Ellesmere in 1616 held that a litigant could invoke 
the equity or conscience of the Chancellor with allegations of fraud, 
mistake, unconscionability, or accident.75 Moreover, courts of equity 
typically made available depositions and other tools of discovery 
unavailable at common law that could justify a litigant’s invocation of 
equitable jurisdiction.76 Sometimes, equitable proceedings ran alongside the 
action at law, performing a supplemental function.77 But often, the party 
invoking equitable jurisdiction would claim that fraud or mistake vitiated a 
contract that would have been regarded as binding at common law.78 
 
a historical matter and observing that “a first proceeding at law or in equity often could be followed by 
a second proceeding in equity or at law”). For an early English case illustrating the refusal of law courts 
to take notice of decrees in equity, see infra note 261. 
Collateral estoppel was a different matter. Courts of equity routinely decided questions of fact—
normally the province of law courts (and juries)—and their findings could enjoy issue-preclusive effect 
in subsequent actions at law. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959) 
(declaring that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury cannot be lost through a prior 
determination of common factual issues in an equitable claim); Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (1 Cranch) 109, 
113–14 (1821). 
74 See Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 67, at 2141, 2145–48. 
75 See 1 BLACK, supra note 73, § 356, at 561–62; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *330 
(writing that the decision on “whether a court of equity could give relief after or against a judgment at 
the common law” came “by the royal prerogative in favor of the court of chancery, of the dispute set on 
foot by Sir Edward Coke”); GEORGE COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE 
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY *xxviii, *8 (New York, Riley 1813); 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A 
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1360, at 973 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (“The use 
of injunctions to stay actions at law was almost coeval with the establishment of the chancery 
jurisdiction.”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 51, at 55 (W.H. Lyon, Jr., ed., 14th ed. 1918); 2 id. § 1197, at 562 (noting 
the importance of equity to interpose in cases of “accident, mistake, and fraud” and to provide 
discovery “which a Court of Law cannot grant”). 
76 See BISPHAM, supra note 73, § 380, at 331 (“It is well established that equity will interfere to 
restrain proceedings at law wherever through . . . want of discovery one of the parties in a suit at law 
obtains, or is likely to obtain, an unfair advantage over the other, so as to make the legal proceedings an 
instrument of injustice.”); id. § 385, at 336 (“[W]here one of the parties to a common-law action desires 
to obtain discovery from his adversary, the jurisdiction of a Court of Chancery will be exercised to 
restrain the other party from proceeding with the action until discovery is obtained.”); 2 STORY, supra 
note 75, § 877, at 255. 
77 See 1 STORY, supra note 75, §§ 116–17, at 116–17 (describing the concurrent jurisdiction of 
courts of equity). 
78 See 1 HENRY MADDOCK, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT 
OF CHANCERY *111 (New York, Clayton & Kingsland 1817) (“It is a general rule . . . that wherever a 
party by fraud, accident, or otherwise, has an advantage in proceeding in a court of ordinary 
jurisdiction, which must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, a court of equity, to 
prevent a manifest wrong, will interpose, by restraining the party whose conscience is thus bound, from 
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Hence, courts of equity exercised the power to stay proceedings at law or to 
enjoin the enforcement of common law judgments.79 This injunctive power 
knew no temporal limits—courts of equity were free to interpose at any 
time, whether to stay trial, to stay enforcement of a judgment, to stay 
execution of a judgment, to prevent assignment of a judgment, or even “to 
stay the money in the hands of the sheriff” following execution of a writ of 
fieri facias.80 
Applications for writs of injunction to stay proceedings at law could 
thus result in the virtual relitigation of the dispute, an unusual consequence 
when viewed through the modern lens of res judicata. To be sure, the 
eighteenth-century lawyer did not necessarily conceive of equity as a mode 
of pure relitigation.81 Common law courts did not take cognizance of 
equitable defenses, thus distinguishing the two proceedings in formal 
terms.82 But as a practical matter, the initiation of a claim in equity could, 
with allegations of fraud or mistake, trigger a second round of litigation. 
 
using the advantage he has improperly gained.”); 1 STORY, supra note 75, § 29, at 26 (describing 
injuries in which “Courts of Equity will interfere and grant redress, but which the common law takes no 
notice of or silently disregards”). 
79 See BLACK, supra note 75, § 356, at 561–62 (describing the origins of the power of courts of 
equity to enjoin the enforcement of judgments at law); ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 14 (Jacob D. Wheeler ed., 2d ed. New York, Gould, Banks & Co. 1839) (“[I]t has 
become one of the most ordinary modes of equitable interposition to afford relief by Injunctions to stay 
proceedings at law.”); 1 SAMUEL TURNER, THE PRESENT PRACTICE AND COSTS OF THE HIGH COURT OF 
CHANCERY 368–69 (Robert Venables ed., 5th ed. London, W. Flint 1817) (footnote omitted) (“The 
Writs of Injunction are made out by the Clerk in Court, the Orders being left with him, and must be 
served personally on the Defendant, his Solicitor, and Attorney. If the Defendant, or his Attorney, 
afterwards proceed in the Cause at Law, contrary to the Direction of the Writs, it will be a Contempt of 
Court, which the Court will punish on Application by Motion for that Purpose . . . .”); WOODDESSON, 
supra note 16, at 162 (recognizing the commonplace quality of the injunction to stay proceedings at law 
and its broad application); WYATT, supra note 18, at 232 (“Where it is prayed to stay proceedings, it is 
commonly upon some matter suggested in the bill; as that the complainant is not able, for some reasons 
shewn, to make his defence in the other court; though he hath a good discharge here in equity . . . .”). 
80 BISPHAM, supra note 73, § 380, at 331; see 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND 
DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 618 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1824) (“An injunction may stay 
trial, or verdict, or judgment, or execution, or money levied thereon in the officer’s hands.”); 1 
MADDOCK, supra note 78, at *109 (footnote omitted) (recognizing that injunctions to stay proceedings 
at common law may be “used to stay trial, or after a verdict to stay judgment, or after a judgment, to 
stay execution, or proceedings under an execution; or if execution has taken place, to stay the money in 
the hands of the sheriff”); WOODDESSON, supra note 16, at 162; WYATT, supra note 18, at 251. 
81 Indeed, early treatises are quick to explain that the equitable power did not constitute an 
unrestrained license to intervene with law-court proceedings and judgments. Rather, equitable 
jurisdiction would typically attach under particular circumstances: fraud, mistake, accident, or 
unconscionability; where parties through no fault of their own were unable to present at trial defenses 
only available in equity; where the more limited availability of discovery in courts of law (as compared 
to equity, where discovery was readily available) would work an injustice; or where necessary to 
protect equitable rights. See BISPHAM, supra note 73, §§ 380, 383–84, at 331, 334–35; BLACK, supra 
note 73, § 365, at 577–78; 3 STORY, supra note 75, §§ 2042–44, at 590–92. 
82 See 1 STORY, supra note 75, § 25, at 22–23 (distinguishing legal rights and remedies from 
equitable ones). 
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Professor William Nelson highlighted this feature of equitable practice in 
his study of colonial North Carolina.83 As Nelson explained: 
[A]ppeals to Chancery . . . were possible and frequent and could result in 
reconsideration of all aspects of a case. . . . [North Carolina] offered a set of 
dispute-resolving institutions and a hope that as litigants tried different forums 
they ultimately would find an acceptable one or alternatively exhaust 
themselves in the process of search.84 
Indeed, Nelson’s study reveals that North Carolina was more freewheeling 
than other colonial courts in allowing equitable relitigation. Unlike, say, 
South Carolina, the courts of North Carolina did not strictly adhere to the 
English limits on equity and as a consequence, relitigation in equity was a 
common occurrence.85 Thus a North Carolina court sitting in equity 
resembled an appellate court of general jurisdiction.86 Couple this wide-
ranging relitigation authority with equity’s traditional reliance on judicial 
(as opposed to jury-based) fact-finding, and one can quickly understand 
why supporters of the common law right to trial by jury may have viewed 
equity with some suspicion. 
The bill of complaint that Morris filed in 1788 to trigger equitable 
relitigation of the Hancock dispute with Allen and the Edentonians is 
revealing.87 Sure enough, the bill recited in great detail the circumstances 
surrounding the capture of the vessel, the prior litigation, and the entry of 
the judgment at law in favor of the Edentonians.88 It went on to identify two 
bases for equitable intervention: Morris alleged a fraudulent conspiracy 
between the plaintiffs at law and two of his co-defendants at law (Iredell 
and Collins); he also sought discovery.89 Morris further added the 
traditional allegation that remedies at common law were inadequate.90 His 
 
83 Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 67, at 2147–48. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 2141, 2147–48. Professor Nelson’s study of Carolina colonial courts has revealed that 
whereas South Carolina’s bench and bar were well versed in the common law, “[i]n a sense, North 
Carolina had no law.” Id. at 2141, 2146–48. 
86 See id. at 2145 (explaining that only rarely “did the Court of Chancery act as an equity court with 
limited jurisdiction rather than a court of appeals broadly empowered to hear any case brought to its 
attention”). Other states had been equally freewheeling during the colonial era. See Oliver Perry 
Chitwood, Justice in Colonial Virginia, in 23 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL 
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 48 (J.M. Vincent, J.H. Hollander & W.W. Willoughby eds., 1905) (reporting 
that in colonial Virginia, anyone wronged by a decision at common law could seek a rehearing in 
chancery, albeit one heard before the same judges). 
87 See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. at 265, 268–69. 
90 See id. at 268. Morris also sought something in the nature of an accounting from the executors of 
Robert Smith’s estate, James Iredell and Josiah Collins. See id. at 281–82. Although typically treated as 
an equitable remedy—mostly for fear that such complex tasks would go beyond the ken of the average 
juror—the request for an accounting alone may not have been enough to warrant equitable interference 
with a judgment at law. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (“As our cases indicate, 
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state court bill of complaint identified the law-court plaintiffs by name and 
prayed that 
each and every of them may be restrained from proceeding at Law against 
your Orators or any of them in the said suit or action instituted against them 
and now depending as aforesaid in one or other of the said Courts of Law of 
the State of North Carolina aforesaid by injunction of this Honorable Court.91 
Under standard principles of equity, these allegations would assure 
reexamination of a judgment that was also pending on appeal.92 
C. Phase Three: Certiorari to Remove the Action to Federal Court 
Much happened in the two years between Morris’s initiation of an 
equitable action in North Carolina state court and his decision to remove 
that action, by certiorari, to the federal circuit court in 1790. First, and most 
obviously, the states ratified the new Constitution.93 Second, Congress 
convened for its first session to legislate the new federal government into 
existence.94 Among other important provisions, the congressional output of 
that year included “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United 
States,” or what we know today as the Judiciary Act of 1789.95 Third, North 
Carolina somewhat reluctantly agreed to join the Union.96 After the state’s 
first ratification convention voted against the new Constitution, leading 
Federalists (including James Iredell and Samuel Johnston) secured a second 
convention at which they carried the day.97 By February 1790, President 
Washington had appointed Justice Iredell to the Supreme Court98 and by 
 
the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference 
to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of 
juries.”); Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 663 (1963) (“One 
reason often given for assuming equitable jurisdiction over an accounting was the difficulty of the case 
for a jury.”). 
91 Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 283. 
92 See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
93 Ratification occurred on September 13, 1788. See Res. of Cong., Sept. 13, 1788, available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/service/rbc/bdsdcc/2410h/0001.jpg. 
94 Congress held its first proceedings under the Constitution on March 4, 1789. See H. JOURNAL, 
1st Cong., 1st Sess. (1789), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ll/llhj/001/0000/00010000.tif. 
95 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
96 See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 412 (1971). 
97 See id. 
98 See Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to George Washington, 
President of the United States (Mar. 3, 1790), in 1 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 284 
(Griffith J. McRee ed., 1949) [hereinafter MCREE’S IREDELL]. 
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June 1790, Congress had passed new legislation incorporating North 
Carolina into the federal court system.99 
The prospect of litigation in the newly minted federal courts in North 
Carolina must have attracted litigants in the position of Robert Morris, who 
was serving (along with William Maclay) as part of the Pennsylvania 
Senate delegation to Congress.100 But the current state of the law made it 
hard to see how he could shift his dispute with Allen and the Edentonians 
into federal court. The jurisdiction of the North Carolina federal district 
court, like other federal district courts around the country, was limited to 
criminal proceedings, admiralty and maritime proceedings associated with 
shipborne trade along the coast, and revenue proceedings.101 Even if 
Morris’s dispute had presented a federal question, the district courts did not 
have general federal question jurisdiction.102 
The jurisdiction of the circuit court may have looked more promising. 
These courts were to be staffed by the district court judge from North 
Carolina and two of the six sitting Supreme Court Justices, whose duties 
included the difficult and expensive task of riding three “circuits” to 
convene courts throughout the country.103 The jurisdiction of the federal 
circuit courts extended to disputes between parties of diverse citizenship, 
such as that between Morris and his Pennsylvania business associates on 
one side against Allen and his fellow North Carolinians on the other.104 
While the diversity provision included a $500 amount-in-controversy 
requirement, Morris’s dispute easily met that threshold.105 Moreover, the 
 
99 See Act of June 4, 1790, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 126, 126 (extending the federal judiciary to North 
Carolina on June 4, 1790, and providing that “the first session of the circuit court shall commence on 
the eighteenth day of June next”). 
100 See JOSEPH C. MORTON, SHAPERS OF THE GREAT DEBATE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302–03 (2006); Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 94–95. Wilson was also a 
member of the Committee of Detail, which in 1787 wrote the first draft of Article III. See 1 DHSC, 
supra note 9, at 118, 119 n.26. Also part of the important Committee of Detail were future Supreme 
Court Justice and signer of the Morris certiorari John Rutledge, future Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph, future Senator and drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1793 Oliver Ellsworth, and Nathaniel 
Gorham. See id.; infra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the role of Justice Rutledge in the 
Morris affair); infra Part III.A (discussing Randolph’s role in shaping the AIA); infra note 270 and 
accompanying text (discussing Ellsworth’s role in drafting the AIA). 
101 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77; 1 GOEBEL, supra note 96, at 471–75. 
102 The first grant of federal question jurisdiction came several years later, in the ill-fated Midnight 
Judges Act of 1801. See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 127. 
103 See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 96, at 471–72. 
104 See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; 1 GOEBEL, supra note 96, at 475–77. 
105 See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 282–83 (praying for relief in the 
amount of “Five thousand Pounds and upwards”). 
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1789 Judiciary Act included provisions that authorized the removal of an 
action in diversity from state to federal court.106 
Yet the jurisdiction of the circuit court was hemmed around with 
exceptions that were apparently designed to frustrate the removal of actions 
like the one that Morris brought. Section 12 of the 1789 Act provided in 
relevant part: 
[I]f a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of 
the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the 
matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred dollars, 
exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court; and 
the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such state court, 
file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit 
court, . . . it shall then be the duty of the state court to accept the surety, and 
proceed no further in the cause . . . .107 
Section 12 thus provided for the removal of actions only by out-of-state 
citizen defendants sued by North Carolinians in a North Carolina state 
court; it did not apply to actions like the one that Morris brought as a 
plaintiff in equity, in the North Carolina state courts.108 Moreover, 
Section 12 required the defendant to initiate removal by filing a petition 
with the state court at the outset of the proceeding and thus appeared to 
foreclose removal of pending actions.109 Morris could not rely on these 
elements of the statute to perfect removal. 
Nor was it obvious that Morris could shift the matter to federal court 
by discontinuing (or nonsuiting) his state action and bringing a new action 
in federal circuit court. To be sure, Section 11 of the Judiciary Act 
conferred on circuit courts “original cognizance, concurrent with the courts 
 
106 See § 11, 1 Stat. at 79–80 (permitting removal only at the request of defendants, for litigation 
“commenced” in state court after the effective date of the statute and brought by a citizen of the state 
“in which the suit is brought” against an alien or citizen of another state). 
Such a phrasing of removal jurisdiction was apparently designed to preserve state court control 
over all debtor–creditor litigation then pending in the state courts, even where the dispute in question 
was (like the Morris case) between diverse citizens and a potential subject of federal judicial power. Of 
particular concern at the time were existing state cases involving British creditor–plaintiffs. By limiting 
removal to defendants only, Section 12 ensured that British plaintiffs with debt actions pending in state 
court could not suddenly alight to friendlier federal forums. See Wythe Holt, John Blair: “A Safe and 
Conscientious Judge,” in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 155, 189 n.25 
(Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998); see also infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
107 § 12, 1 Stat. at 79. By limiting the right of removal to defendants only, Senator Oliver 
Ellsworth—chief drafter of the 1789 Act—made a “shrewd concession to Anti-Federalists.” Holt, supra 
note 106, at 189 n.25. Section 12 did, however, allow removal by either plaintiff or defendant where the 
parties were citizens of the same state claiming land under grants from different states. § 12, 1 Stat. at 
80. 
108 See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 101 (explaining that Morris’s “case did not meet the 
conditions for removal set out in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act because . . . Morris was the plaintiff 
rather than defendant”). 
109 See § 12, 1 Stat. at 79. 
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of the several States,” of suits in law and equity between citizens from 
different states.110 But unlike courts of law, which recognized an essentially 
absolute right in the plaintiff to dismiss voluntarily before judgment,111 
courts of equity would review applications to dismiss a bill and would deny 
leave to dismiss on a showing of prejudice to the defendant.112 Thus, in 
North Carolina and elsewhere, once a proceeding had reached a certain 
level of maturity (comparable to what we might describe today as 
“proceedings of substance on the merits”113), the plaintiff could not dismiss 
as of right.114 As we will see, the North Carolina state court raised this 
relative maturity as an argument against removal through certiorari, noting 
that several “decretal” orders had been entered.115 In any event, it appears 
that a voluntary dismissal would have occasioned the imposition of a 
substantial award of costs that Morris may have preferred to avoid.116 
 
110 § 11, 1 Stat. at 78. 
111 For the common law rule, permitting the plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice at any time 
before judgment (nonsuit), see O’Mealey v. Wilson, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1029, 1029; 1 Camp. 482, 
482. The post-verdict right of dismissal was abolished by statute. See Price v. Parker, (1795) 91 Eng. 
Rep. 163, 163 (K.B.); 1 Salk. 178, 178 (refusing to permit plaintiff to file a nonsuit after return of a 
general verdict); Keat v. Barker, (1794) 87 Eng. Rep, 612, 612 (K.B.); 5 Mod. 208, 208 (same); Neil C. 
Head, The History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20, 23–24 (1920). 
112 This longstanding rule of English equity was carried into American practice and eventually 
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in Rule 41 qualified the right of the 
plaintiff to dismiss the action voluntarily. See Booth v. Leycester, (1836) 48 Eng. Rep. 301, 301; 1 
Keen 247, 247 (refusing to permit plaintiff to dismiss bill after matter had been set for a hearing that 
was likely to have led to a decree). For a restatement of the English rule, see Bronx Brass Foundry, Inc. 
v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U.S. 230, 232 (1936), which confirms that a court of equity may refuse to 
permit a plaintiff to discontinue the action upon a showing of prejudice to the defendants, and Ex parte 
Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 93 (1924), which quotes Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Central 
Transportation Co., 171 U.S. 138, 146 (1898), to explain that prejudice to the defendant was the 
ordinary basis on which a court of equity would decline to permit the plaintiff “to dismiss his bill 
without prejudice at his own costs.” See generally Head, supra note 111 (discussing the history and 
development of the common law nonsuit). 
113 See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (requiring federal courts to apply the doctrine 
of equitable restraint so long as the state proceeding was initiated before the federal court had 
conducted “proceedings of substance on the merits”). Notably, the Supreme Court did not apparently 
draw on equity practice in formulating its rule. 
114 See 89 A.L.R. 45 (1934) (“[T]he [North Carolina] rule in cases of a purely equitable nature is 
that the plaintiff may submit to a judgment of nonsuit at any time before any decree or decretal order 
has been made under which rights of the defendant have attached in the course of the action which he 
has a right to have settled and concluded therein.”). Ostensibly, the rule guarded against abuse of the 
voluntary nonsuit mechanism by plaintiffs. 
115 See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
116 See Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 67, at 2189 (noting that “the [North Carolina] 
county courts were hostile to outsiders, as evidenced by a court rule that ‘if any attorney’ brought 
‘suit . . . in behalf of one out of the county such attorney shall be liable to pay the fees’ in the event of ‘a 
nonsuit . . . [,] verdict against the plaintiff,’ or default in prosecution” (citing Order re Suits by 
Nonresidents, Rowan County Court (July 15, 1755), in 1 ABSTRACTS OF THE MINUTES OF THE COURT 
OF PLEAS AND QUARTER SESSIONS, ROWAN COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 1753–1762, at 40 (Jo White 
Linn ed., 1977))). 
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For Morris, then, certiorari provided an appealing alternative. The writ 
had originated at common law to enable either party to remove a pending 
action—often but not invariably a criminal proceeding—from an inferior to 
a superior court.117 (Today, we think of the Supreme Court’s statutory 
certiorari authority as a form of appellate jurisdiction, but common law 
certiorari could operate to effect the removal of an action for trial or other 
disposition on the merits in a superior court.)118 As for legal authority, 
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had empowered the federal courts 
 
117 On the origins of the common law writ of certiorari, see Weintraub, supra note 13, for a 
description of the early use of certiorari in Tudor England as a writ to effect the removal of both civil 
and criminal proceedings for further proceedings in a superior court. Weintraub explains that the writ 
later evolved into an all-purpose tool for judicial review of administrative action. Id. at 505–16. 
118 For the elements of common law certiorari, see 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF 
THE LAW *349–59 (6th ed. 1793), which discusses the removal of indictments into King’s Bench for 
trial and the requirement that bond be posted to ensure a relatively speedy trial after removal, and 2 AN 
ABRIDGMENT OF THE MODERN DETERMINATIONS IN THE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY: SUPPLEMENT 
TO VINER’S ABRIDGMENT 1–30 (London, A. Strahan 1799) [hereinafter AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE 
MODERN DETERMINATIONS], which notes the power of King’s Bench, by virtue of its general 
superintendency over inferior tribunals, to remove any criminal action by certiorari. Among other 
things, these authorities make clear that certiorari affects removal of the action for proceedings in a 
superior court, that it applies to both criminal and civil proceedings, id. at 11 n.22 (citing Daniel v. 
Phillips, (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1141 (K.B.); 4 T.R. 500), that the plaintiff in a civil matter can remove 
his own action by certiorari, id. at 23–24 (citing Keeling v. Elliott, (1790) 94 Eng. Rep. 974; Trinity 28 
Geo. 2; Barnes 399), and that a party can attempt to show cause for removal by pointing to prejudice on 
the part of a local court, id. at 9, 11, 17 (citing Daniel, 100 Eng. Rep. 1141; Rex v. Cowle, (1759) 97 
Eng. 587 (K.B.); 2 Burr. 834, 859; Williams v. Thomas (1782), East. 22 Geo. 3; Doug. 751 n.2). Viner 
and Bacon also agree as to the proper remedy for disobedience: an attachment directed at the judges of 
the inferior court. See BACON, supra, at 359; AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE MODERN DETERMINATIONS, 
supra, at 17 (describing motion for attachment against lower court officer for noncompliance with writ). 
One finds some disagreement in the cases on the question of what sort of showing must be made 
to secure a certiorari. In some criminal matters, the writ issued as a matter of course. But in other 
matters, the superior court required a showing of cause and notice to the court below. See AN 
ABRIDGMENT OF THE MODERN DETERMINATIONS, supra, at 17 (citing Williams, Doug. 751, in which 
Lord Mansfield ruled that the writ did not issue as a matter of course); id. at 18 (citing Rex v. Nicholls 
(1785), Hil. 25 Geo. 3; 5 T.R. 280, in which the superior court quashed the writ of certiorari on the 
ground that no notice had been given to the justices before the motion for a rule to show cause). Viner 
also reports that a certiorari “ought not to be granted in vacation, but in open court, and upon a ground 
shewn.” Id. at 9 (citing Rex v. Eaton, (1787) 100 Eng. Rep. 49; 2 T.R. 89). Even if sufficient cause were 
shown at the outset, the opposing party might move to quash or supersede the certiorari. Id. at 17–18 
(citing Rex, 5 T.R. 280; Williams, Doug. 751). One can probably best characterize the practice as one in 
which the party moving or petitioning for certiorari makes an initial showing and secures issuance of 
the writ if the superior court agrees that the petition makes out a plausible claim. The writ would 
operate as a show-cause order, directing a removal of the proceedings in the absence of further 
proceedings, but inviting the opposing party to move to quash if the initial writ issued in error. For 
suggestions along these lines, albeit in the context of the practice of King’s Bench, see Kevin Costello, 
The Writ of Certiorari and Review of Summary Criminal Convictions, 1660–1790, at 7–8 (Nov. 6, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), which describes a process in which the party 
seeking certiorari first notified the justices of the lower court, then filed a petition with King’s Bench 
along with supporting affidavits to secure removal, then served the writ on the lower court, and then 
proceeded in the superior court following the certification of the record into that court. 
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to issue “all . . . writs” and thus seemingly included the writ of certiorari.119 
But Section 14 was qualified too: it applied only to writs “necessary for the 
exercise of [the federal courts’] respective jurisdictions” and allowed courts 
to issue such writs only in accordance with “the principles and usages of 
law,” an apparent reference to the rules of common law inherited from 
England.120 The statute thus implied that the writs in question could not 
operate to confer jurisdiction on a federal court but could issue only to 
secure or effectuate a jurisdiction elsewhere conferred. (Eventually, the 
Supreme Court confirmed this understanding, holding some two centuries 
later that the All Writs Act did not provide a freestanding source of 
removal authority.)121 
One could thus question the power of the federal circuit court to 
proceed via certiorari on at least two grounds. First, to the extent that 
Congress had foreclosed the exercise of removal jurisdiction over pending 
cases like Morris v. Allen, the use of certiorari to effect removal would 
appear to violate the statutory requirement that the writ issue only where 
necessary to effectuate the court’s stated jurisdiction. Moreover, to the 
extent that the writ operated at common law to effect removal of 
proceedings from an inferior to a superior court, one can question the 
power of a lower federal court to issue the writ to a state court. State courts 
were creatures of state governments, needless to say, and were not made 
inferior to the federal courts, except to the extent that the Judiciary Act 
subjected their decisions to review in the Supreme Court. Nor did the state 
court’s power to hear the Morris case depend on congressional 
authorization; the state’s jurisdiction over such disputes predated the 
Constitution as part of what Alexander Hamilton and others termed the 
state’s primitive or preexisting jurisdiction.122 
 
119 Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. 
120 Id. 
121 See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002) (“Section 1441[, the removal 
statute,] requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be 
removed from a state court. The All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary 
jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement.”). Today’s All Writs Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006), is “the lineal successor” to the all writs powers conferred under Section 14 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789. James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to 
Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1466–67 (2000). 
122 For an account of Hamilton’s conception of the primitive or preexisting jurisdiction of the state 
courts, and his notion that such jurisdiction would remain intact following the creation of the federal 
courts under Article III, see James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the 
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191, 216–20 (2007), which 
describes Hamilton’s argument in Federalist No. 82 about the presumption in favor of concurrent state 
and federal jurisdiction over diversity proceedings, among others. In contrast to diversity proceedings, 
one can argue that the power of the state courts to hear federal question cases depends on the 
willingness of Congress to assign those matters to the states, thus providing a basis for considering the 
state courts inferior to their federal counterparts. Id. at 216 (quoting Hamilton’s comment that 
assignment of federal jurisdiction to state courts would constitute them as inferior tribunals within the 
meaning of Article I of the Constitution). 
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One might try to answer these doubts in various ways. If one were to 
regard federal jurisdiction as mandatorily vested in federal courts, then one 
might argue that the All Writs Act served to implement the “jurisdiction” 
conferred in the Constitution, rather than that conferred by statute.123 A 
more promising approach would be to argue that the use of certiorari serves 
to implement the provision in Section 11 that gives the federal circuit 
courts original cognizance, concurrent with the state courts, of diversity 
matters arising in law or equity.124 On a generous interpretation, and leaving 
aside the implications of Section 12 removal limits, one might consider 
certiorari as serving to effectuate the Section 11 grant of original and 
concurrent jurisdiction over matters brought by out-of-staters like Morris 
against locals from North Carolina. Certainly, Morris’s conspiracy claims 
against a group of state insiders would appear to implicate the bias-
 
123 The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction has been widely described as mandatory and self-
executing. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early 
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1568 (1986) 
(“For Attorney General Randolph and all of the [J]ustices except Iredell, federal jurisdiction was 
mandatory or at least self-executing; it was neither dependent upon congressional grant nor subject to 
congressional curtailment.”); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1289 n.141 (1989) (“I do not regard it as 
established that, in fact, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction was intended by the framers to be 
self-executing. I do regard it as relatively clear, however, that four of the five [J]ustices in Chisholm 
might reasonably have been thought by the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment to have held that 
opinion.”). 
The All Writs Act might be regarded as authority for the judicial recognition of writs to carry the 
Court’s original jurisdiction into effect, as Justice Iredell recognized in his dissent in Chisholm. See 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432–34 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“I conceive, that all 
the Courts of the United States must receive, not merely their organization as to the number of Judges 
of which they are to consist; but all their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the 
Legislature only. . . . The [All Writs Act] . . . provides in the following words: ‘All the before 
mentioned Courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of feire facias, habeas corpus, 
and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their 
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.’ These words refer as well to 
the Supreme Court as to the other Courts of the United States.” (emphasis omitted)). For an argument 
that the All Writs Act also implements the Court’s constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction, see 
Pfander, supra note 121, at 1497–98, which observes that the Supreme Court, but not the lower federal 
courts, receives its jurisdiction directly from the Constitution. 
Scholars have, to be sure, occasionally argued that some portion of the jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts might also be regarded as constitutionally compelled. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 
(1985). But the argument has yet to carry the day. Cf. John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit 
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997) 
(defending the “traditional view that Congress’s authority [to limit the federal courts’ jurisdiction] is 
substantial”). But whatever the merits of the argument for mandatory vesting, few would contend that it 
applies to jurisdiction over disputes based on the citizenship of the parties. See Amar, supra, at 209–10 
(distinguishing between mandatory jurisdiction over federal question cases and permissive jurisdiction 
over diverse party controversies). 
124 See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79. 
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prevention rationale most often associated with the exercise of diversity 
jurisdiction.125 
Unfortunately, the historical record does not reveal on what basis the 
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina issued the certiorari to 
the North Carolina state court. The actual certiorari itself does not appear to 
exist126 and the scant surviving correspondence provides little evidence of 
the Justices’ thinking.127 We do know that three Supreme Court Justices, 
James Wilson, John Rutledge, and John Blair, acting in their capacity as 
circuit judges, signed the writ of certiorari in the fall of 1790.128 That in 
itself seems odd; federal law provided for circuit courts to meet at specified 
times, convened by two circuit-riding Supreme Court Justices and one 
district judge.129 The fact that three Justices and no district judge signed the 
papers tends to suggest that the certiorari was drafted by Morris’s attorney 
and presented to the Justices out of court for their signatures. 
Correspondence from Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison, confirms 
this supposition.130 Harison made it clear that he had approached Justice 
Rutledge out of court in August or September 1790 to secure both a 
certiorari and a writ of injunction staying the state court proceedings.131 
 
125 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
126 Based on Morris’s correspondence discussing the planned removal to federal court in 
September 1790, see Letter from Richard Nichols Harison, U.S. Attorney for the District of N.Y., to 
Robert Morris (Sept. 7, 1790) [hereinafter Harison Letter 1], in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 87, 87–88, 
and the reaction of North Carolina Superior Court judges in November 1790, see infra note 166 and 
accompanying text, we estimate that the certiorari issued during the fall of 1790. See also Holt & Perry, 
supra note 5, at 103, 117 n.43. 
127 We do have some evidence that the certiorari may have been issued on the fly, so to speak, 
without careful consideration of opposing arguments. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, we have evidence that at least one of the Justices who signed the certiorari—Justice Blair—
came to entertain substantial doubts about its propriety. He wrote to Justice Wilson, fellow signatory of 
the certiorari: 
I have even doubted whether a certiorari ought ever to issue, in any case, from the courts of the 
U.S. to those of a State; & whether that, or any other writ, ought ever to be sent for arresting the 
progress of a cause, of which a State-court has once had possession. . . . But I have never known a 
Certiorari to issue, except to inferior, for calling up a record before superior judges, who have 
confessed a right to control[] their proceedings. 
Letter from John Blair, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to James Wilson, Assoc. Justice of the 
Supreme Court (Feb. 2, 1791), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 126, 128; see also infra note 128 and 
accompanying text. 
128 See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 126, 130 n.1; see also supra note 126. 
129 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
130 See Harison Letter 1, supra note 126, at 87–88; Letter from Richard Nichols Harison to Robert 
Morris (Sept. 24, 1790) [hereinafter Harison Letter 2], in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 95, 98 (concluding 
that the best course was to transmit the certiorari and associated papers to Morris, where he could obtain 
signatures from Justices Wilson and Rutledge “who will be in Philadelphia in a few Days”). Harison 
explained that this course was necessitated by the view of the Justices that “two of them should concur 
in granting an Injunction when the Court was not sitting.” Id. at 98.  
131 See Harison Letter 1, supra note 126, at 87 (footnote omitted) (“Judge Rutledge is now absent 
upon a Tour to the Eastward, but upon his Return I shall use every Effort to get your Cause into the 
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Justice Rutledge was reportedly willing to grant both writs, but ostensibly 
demurred on the basis that the Judiciary Act extended the all writs power to 
the “Court” and could not be read to empower a single Justice to act for the 
court in granting writs.132 Other pieces of the historical record confirm that 
the signatures were obtained out of court. During the fall of 1790, Justices 
Rutledge and Iredell rode the Southern Circuit (North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia).133 Justices Wilson and Blair were then riding the 
Middle Circuit (New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 
Virginia).134 It seems likely that the signatures of Justices Wilson and Blair 
and perhaps even Rutledge were obtained while they were riding their 
circuits, rather than in open court in North Carolina.135 
Building on Justice Rutledge’s well-founded concern with proceedings 
occurring out of court,136 one can certainly question the procedural 
propriety of the writ’s issuance on the basis of the ambulatory fiat of three 
Justices. For starters, three Justices do not make a circuit court any more 
than does a single Justice. Congress had provided for the circuit courts to 
 
federal Court & to procure that Justice for the concerned which may be expected from an impartial 
Tribunal.”); Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 102–03. Although ex parte injunctions were certainly not the 
norm, one early treatise suggests that “in pressing cases,” an injunction would “be granted upon petition 
and affidavit before the bill filed” and that this was “often done in vacation.” 2 MADDOCK, supra note 
78, at *174; see id. at *177–78 (explaining that injunctions normally issued only after the bill was filed 
and served on the defendant). 
132 See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130, at 95, 98. 
133 See Judicial Administration and Organization—Organization of the Southern Circuit, FED. JUD. 
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_02_14.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013); U.S. 
Circuit Courts for the Districts of North Carolina, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nGetCourt?cid=249&order=c&ctype=cc&instate=nc (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). 
134 See Judicial Administration and Organization—Organization of the Middle Circuit, FED. JUD. 
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_02_13.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013); U.S. 
Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetCourt?
cid=248&order=c&ctype=cc&instate=nj (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). 
135 This is consistent with correspondence from Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison. See supra 
notes 130–32 and accompanying text. Notably, Harison also served as the United States attorney for the 
district of New York and would have doubtless attended the August 1790 Term of the Supreme Court, 
held in New York City. See Harison Letter 1, supra note 126, at 87; The Court as an Institution, 
SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/institution.aspx (last visited Dec. 29, 2013) 
(describing the Court’s first session). Although Harison could have easily approached the three Justices, 
in town for the Court’s Term, to secure their signatures, it appears that he did not obtain their signatures 
until sometime later. He reported in September 1790 that he was still hoping to obtain Justice 
Rutledge’s fiat when he returned from his tour of the Eastern circuit. See Harison Letter 1, supra note 
126. Only after Harison realized that Justice Rutledge would not alone sign the writ did he decide to 
approach more Justices, well after the August Term had ended and the Justices had dispersed on their 
circuits. See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130. 
136 As noted above, Section 14 conferred the power to issue all writs necessary to effectuate 
jurisdiction on the courts themselves, rather than the judges who staff those courts. See Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. The explicit 
exception, granting power to circuit judges to grant writs of habeas corpus out of court, tends to prove 
the rule. See Mayton, supra note 5, at 334. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
212 
sit at specified times and places, to ensure due consideration of the issues 
on the basis of open proceedings in which all could participate. Justices 
who did judicial business out of court would undermine this commitment to 
transparency and deliberation. One might also criticize the out-of-court 
issuance of the writ on the additional ground that the opposing party was 
denied notice and an opportunity to be heard on the points of law presented 
by the application.137 But practice on the writ of certiorari may have 
entailed ex parte issuance of the writ on a petition with supporting papers 
from the moving party, followed by service of the writ on the inferior court 
and opposing parties and further proceedings before the superior court.138 
Perhaps then one can understand the issuance of the certiorari as a rule to 
show cause aimed at initiating removal and inviting further proceedings as 
needed to determine the removal’s propriety.139 
One final procedural wrinkle deserves separate discussion. 
Correspondence from Morris’s attorney makes clear that he meant to seek 
both a writ of certiorari to effect the removal of the action, and a writ of 
injunction.140 Perhaps the injunction was meant to stay the state court 
proceeding and was to have issued as a writ ancillary to the certiorari, but 
perhaps not. At common law, certiorari itself operated as a mandatory writ, 
compelling the inferior court to certify the record to a higher court and to 
 
137 As a further complicating factor, one of the Justices assigned to the Southern Circuit, James 
Iredell, was a party to the Morris litigation and could not participate in any decision about the issuance 
of the certiorari. One might suppose that the two remaining circuit judges (Justice Rutledge and District 
Court Judge John Stokes) could have conducted circuit business even after Justice Iredell recused 
himself. But Stokes died in 1790, shortly after receiving his nomination to the bench, and never sat with 
the court. See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 107. Perhaps Morris’s attorney anticipated the inability of the 
Southern Circuit to grant effective relief and approached the Justices of the Middle Circuit in order to 
avoid having to wait until spring 1791 to secure the certiorari. 
138 On the two-step process common to applications for such prerogative writs as habeas corpus 
and mandamus, see James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First 
Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 919–20 
& n.71 (1997), which describes the initial issuance of the writ in the nature of an order to show cause. 
This served to start the proceeding, invited a reply from the respondent, and led to the issuance of the 
mandatory writ. On the extension of this familiar two-step process to certiorari, see FORREST G. FERRIS 
& FORREST G. FERRIS, JR., THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES §§ 176–80, at 201–06 
(1926); GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CERTIORARI AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER 
THE STATUTES (New York, Lawyers’ Coop. Publ’g Co. 1893); and Edward Jenks, The Prerogative 
Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 529 (1923), which reports that although certiorari was 
available as a matter of right to remove criminal matters, it came to be regarded as a prerogative writ to 
be issued only in the exercise of judicial discretion based on a showing of cause. 
The ex parte basis on which the Justices apparently proceeded may also help to explain why they 
issued the certiorari, but did not issue the writ of injunction that Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison, had 
also requested. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. Injunctive relief would bind the parties, 
making ex parte proceedings especially problematic. 
139 Certainly Justice Iredell was to experience the Morris certiorari less as a one-off event than as a 
matter of ongoing concern that was to remain alive on the docket of the North Carolina circuit for 
several months to come. See infra notes 266–68 and accompanying text. 
140 See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130; see also supra note 138. 
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proceed no further in the action.141 Like other prerogative writs, certiorari 
was enforceable through a body attachment (contempt) directed at the 
judges of the inferior court.142 In other words, the writ of certiorari, if 
issued, would itself effect a stay of the lower court proceeding and would 
threaten the judges with contempt if they continued proceedings in the 
case. 
Although Morris may have asked to stay the equity proceeding that he 
was proposing to remove from state court, it seems to us likely that the 
application for an injunction was meant to stay the enforcement of the state 
court Hancock judgment, which had awarded damages to Allen and his 
associates. It was the Hancock common law judgment that Morris was 
seeking to enjoin in his North Carolina equity proceeding. The purpose of 
the application for certiorari was to shift the forum for equitable relitigation 
of the Hancock judgment from state to federal court. The Justices who 
signed the certiorari may well have concluded that it was premature to 
issue a stay of the Hancock judgment through writ of injunction. Such an 
order would have been directed not to the North Carolina court of equity or 
its judges but to the parties to the Hancock proceeding, in keeping with 
equity’s in personam operation.143 We therefore see a fundamental 
difference between the writ of certiorari, which operated to initiate the 
removal and was addressed to the state court, and the writ of injunction, 
which would have run against the parties and would have provided the 
 
141 By definition, a certiorari is “[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its 
discretion, directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 258 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). The Court of Exchequer, for example, required that 
bills praying for writs of certiorari “state the proceedings which have been had in the inferior court” and 
“the incompetency of that court.” 1 DAVID BURTON FOWLER, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF 
EXCHEQUER, UPON PROCEEDINGS IN EQUITY 44 (London, T. Burton 1795) (emphasis added). The 
King’s Bench claimed the power to issue writs to all inferior jurisdictions as part of its general 
supervisory power. 1 BACON, supra note 118, at 350 (“The Court of King’s Bench has a 
Superintendancy over all Courts of an Inferior Criminal Jurisdiction, and may by the Plenitude of its 
Power award a Certiorari, to have any Indictment removed and brought before itself . . . .”). As 
described in an early writ formulary documenting mid-nineteenth-century practice in North Carolina, 
the writ itself would routinely “command” removal of the case to the superior issuing court. See 
WILLIAM EATON, JR., BOOK OF PRACTICAL FORMS, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES AND REFERENCES TO 
AUTHORITIES 219 (Philadelphia, C. Sherman 1854) (“We . . . command you that the transcript of the 
proceedings in the said cause, and of the record of the said judgment, . . . you send to the honorable the 
Judge of the Superior Court of Law . . . so that we may have them before the Judge of the said Superior 
Court . . . and further do thereupon what of right we shall see fit to be done.”). 
142 See 1 BACON, supra note 118, at 359 (“AFTER the Certiorari delivered, if the Inferior Court 
proceeds, where by Law it ought not, it is a Contempt, for which the Court will grant an Attachment.”). 
143 3 STORY, supra note 75, § 2041, at 590 (footnote omitted) (“Equity never attempts to act upon 
the Court of Law itself, and does not claim any supervisory power over such courts or the proceedings 
therein. It acts solely upon the party . . . .”); 4 POMEROY, supra note 75, § 1360, at 974 (“Injunction is 
the remedy which, above all others, necessarily operates in personam.”). Contrast the writs of certiorari 
and prohibition, which operated not on the parties but on the inferior court itself. See BISPHAM, supra 
note 73, § 381, at 333. 
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procedural context in which the federal court would assess (and relitigate) 
the equities of the Hancock judgment. 
Precisely such a distinction seems to have informed Justice Rutledge’s 
reported reaction to Morris’s out-of-court application for writs of certiorari 
and injunction. Justice Rutledge reportedly said that he had “no Objection 
to the Propriety of removing the Suit, or to granting the Injunction as far as 
the Merits of the Cause were concerned.”144 Justice Rutledge thus appears 
to have distinguished the writ of certiorari, which would serve to remove 
the action, from the writ of injunction, which could call for an assessment 
of the merits. The other Justices drew a similar distinction, apparently; the 
limited evidence we have suggests that the Justices agreed to sign Morris’s 
writ of certiorari but not the writ of injunction.145 
The Morris certiorari controversy thus raised two questions. First, and 
most obviously, it presented the question whether a writ of certiorari could 
properly issue from a federal circuit to a state court (and whether the state 
court was obliged to comply). It was that question that attracted most of the 
attention in the press.146 Second, and less obviously but perhaps of more 
far-reaching significance, the Morris case raised the possibility that parties 
could invoke federal diversity jurisdiction (either originally or by removal) 
for the purpose of revisiting a dispute that had been previously settled in a 
common law action in state court. 
D. Interlude: Federal Relitigation of State Judgments 
Before we move to the final phase of the Morris saga, the early crisis 
in state–federal judicial relations that erupted in the wake of his well-
publicized certiorari, we pause to observe the legal backdrop against which 
Morris formed his litigation strategy—a strategy that may seem unusual to 
modern eyes. Recall that Morris was seeking relief from an adverse state 
court judgment at law—the Hancock judgment—by first resorting to the 
state court (as both a defendant–appellant at law and a plaintiff in equity) 
and then seeking to remove his equitable action to the federal courts 
through the mechanism of certiorari. One might suppose that the obligation 
of the federal courts to accord full faith and credit to state court judgments 
would have precluded any federal equitable relitigation of final state court 
judgments like the Hancock judgment. But such an understanding rests 
 
144 See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130, at 95. 
145 Although Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison, had requested both writs, see Harison Letter 2, 
supra note 130 (“I am persuaded that Mr. Rutledge will join in granting the proper Writs, the most 
material of which I think is the Injunction[.] The Certiorari might be deferred till the Meeting of the 
Court, if it is at all necessary, which I very much doubt[.]”), there is no evidence that an injunction ever 
issued, see Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 103; see also supra note 138. Such an approach makes sense 
if one regards the certiorari as the first step in perfecting removal, directed to the “lower” court, and 
further understands the injunction as a decree that would issue to the parties after service of process was 
completed in the federal court. 
146 See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing national reaction to the Morris certiorari). 
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upon modern notions of claim preclusion—notions informed by the 
twentieth-century merger of actions at law and equity into a single civil 
action in which the parties are expected to resolve all related issues.147 In 
the eighteenth century, by contrast, law and equity remained quite disjoint; 
a judgment at law did not bar equitable relitigation of the same claim, as 
the colonial history of North Carolina makes clear.148 So long as state courts 
of equity were free to relitigate law-court judgments from the same state,149 
nothing in the pre-AIA federal law would prevent similar relitigation in a 
federal court. 
In reaching this conclusion we consider both the Constitution’s Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the full faith and credit legislation that 
Congress adopted in May 1790 (1790 Act).150 The Constitution governs 
only the respect owed in “each state” to the judgments, records, and 
judicial proceedings of “other state[s].”151 Morris did not involve 
proceedings of another state. In contrast to the constitutional provision, the 
1790 Act imposed on “every court within the United States” the obligation 
to give “such faith and credit” to the duly authenticated “records and 
judicial proceedings” as they have by “law or usage” in the courts from 
which the records were taken.152 This statute thus imposed a faith and credit 
obligation on the federal circuit court for the District of North Carolina in 
respect of the records and judicial proceedings of the North Carolina state 
courts—something that the Constitution had simply failed to address.153 
Scholars debate the degree to which the 1790 Act operates merely as 
an evidentiary rule for judgments or prescribes their substantive effect.154 
 
147 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. For an account of the merger of law and equity, see 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
148 See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra Part II.B. 
150 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. 
151 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Hancock judgment was not being attacked in cross-border 
litigation; Morris was challenging the equities of the judgment in North Carolina. 
152 We agree with those who understand the statutory provision to extend the faith and credit 
obligation to federal courts. One can certainly argue that the federal courts were not bound by the 
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, but Congress presumably has ample power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to impose a “same faith and credit” obligation on federal courts. Act of 
May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. at 122. 
153 This omission makes sense in light of Article III’s agnosticism on the subject of lower federal 
courts. 
154 See Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and 
Credit, 12 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 1, 39–56 (1981) (discussing the dispute over the meaning of the 
1790 Act); compare, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 295 (1992) (“I am inclined to 
believe that the Full Faith and Credit Act specified the effects of state statutes from the beginning.”), 
with Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1206–07 
(2009) (arguing that the 1790 Act “address[ed] the authentication of state judgments while leaving their 
substantive effect unchanged”). 
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But whatever one’s view of that question, the Act can scarcely have been 
understood to have foreclosed federal equitable relitigation of state court 
judgments at law, at least so long as relitigation was open in state courts of 
equity. The 1790 Act required at most that the prior judgment be given the 
same effect that it would have had in the court that entered the judgment. 
That was the lesson of Mills v. Duryee, which held that state courts called 
upon to recognize a prior judgment must “inquire in every case what is the 
effect of a judgment in the state where it is rendered” and give the 
judgment that same effect.155 Justice Wilson, riding circuit in 1794, adopted 
the same approach in Armstrong v. Carson’s Executor.156 Armstrong, who 
had won a judgment against Carson’s executor in the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, brought an action in the Pennsylvania federal circuit court to recover 
the debt.157 The defendant offered a plea that would not have been accepted 
in New Jersey state court, had the action been brought there.158 Justice 
Wilson reasoned that “[i]f the plea would be bad in the Courts of New-
Jersey, it is bad here” because the 1790 Act “declar[es] in direct terms . . . 
that the record shall have the same effect in this Court . . . as in the Court 
from which it was taken.”159 
We have no evidence that the 1790 Act, which took effect some 
months earlier, was discussed in connection with the issuance of the Morris 
certiorari. But the mode of reasoning that Justice Wilson used in Armstrong 
(and that the Court later adopted in Mills160) would have almost certainly 
allowed federal courts to issue injunctions restraining state court 
judgments: to the extent that state A’s courts of equity would grant 
injunctions to restrain state A’s judgments at law, so too could federal court 
B using its equitable powers enjoin state A’s law-court judgment. We know 
that the state court of equity in North Carolina was free to restrain the 
enforcement of Allen’s law-court judgment in Hancock. A federal court, 
adopting the same-effect test announced in Armstrong and Mills, would 
therefore enjoy similar freedom to use its equitable powers to enjoin 
enforcement of the Hancock judgment. The Morris certiorari thus served to 
underscore the threat to state court judgments posed by federal equitable 
relitigation—a threat that the 1790 Act was not designed to address.161 
 
155 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813). 
156 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 302 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794). 
157 Id. at 302. 
158 Id. at 303. 
159 Id. 
160 See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1647 (2009) 
(footnote omitted) (“What prevailed in [Mills] . . . was the view propounded at length by Justice 
Washington at circuit, and originally by the late Justice Wilson [in Armstrong].”). 
161 Notably, Justice Wilson’s interpretation of the 1790 Act (as one prescribing the substantive 
effects to be granted sister-state judgments) did not represent the majority view at the time. See Sachs, 
supra note 154, at 1242–46 (discussing early decisions that did not embrace the Armstrong doctrine). 
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E. Phase Four: The Certiorari and Federal–State Judicial Relations 
Whatever the propriety of the writ’s issuance out of court and in the 
teeth of statutory limits on removal jurisdiction, the historical record 
suggests that the federal marshal for North Carolina dutifully served the 
Morris certiorari on the state court.162 To the North Carolina Antifederalists 
who had long opposed constitutional ratification on the basis that the 
federal judiciary would “absorb and destroy” the state courts, the Morris 
certiorari was surely a confirmation of their worst fears.163 What ensued 
was an important early clash between the federal and state judiciaries.164 
1. The Fallout in North Carolina.—Angered by the implication that 
their courts were inferior to a federal circuit court and that their 
proceedings were subject to midstream removal, all three judges of the 
North Carolina Superior Court refused to obey the writ of certiorari.165 The 
judges promptly issued a “declaration,” announcing the court’s intention to 
defy the writ and outlining their reasoning: 
 First, Because that being a Court of original, general, Supreme and 
unlimited Jurisdiction, they apprehended that as such a Court they were not 
amenable to the Authority of any other Judiatory; and consequently that they 
did not conceive, that the Suits and Proceedings depending before them in 
their judicial Capacity, were subject to be called or taken from the said Court 
of Equity by the mandatory Writ of any other Court or Jurisdiction whatever; 
much less by that of a Court of Inferior and limited Jurisdiction. 
 Secondly, Because they conceived, that as Judges of the several Superior 
Courts of Law, and Courts of Equity, within the State, they were not subject to 
the Mandate of any Writ . . . . 
 Thirdly, that the Suit required to be certified by the aforesaid Writ of 
Certiorari, is not in such a stage, or so circumstanced, as to be removable from 
the said Court of Equity . . . pursuant to the Act of Congress in that Case 
provided; the aforesaid Suit in Equity being now not in its first Stage, and not 
unproceeded upon; but having been commenced several Years ago, and . . . 
had been twice heard on solemn Argument, and several decretal Orders had 
been made therein; And the Removal of the said Suit being required not at the 
Instance of Defendants . . . but at the Instance of the Complainants, . . . [t]hat 
 
To the extent that contemporaries viewed the Act as performing a mere evidentiary function, it would 
have done even less to assuage concerns raised by Morris. 
162 See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 111. 
163 “Marcus” (James Iredell), Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution 
Recommended by the Late Convention at Philadelphia (Jan. 8, 1788), in 2 MCREE’S IREDELL, supra 
note 98, at 193. In this essay written under the pseudonym “Marcus,” Iredell responded to Antifederalist 
concerns that “[t]he judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and 
destroy the judiciaries of the several States.” Id.; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 97, 103. 
164 See generally Holt & Perry, supra note 5 (documenting in remarkable detail this 
interjurisdictional clash). 
165 See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 111–12. 
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this Case was therefore obviously not within the Purview of the 
aforementioned Act of Congress, for removing a Cause from a State Court to 
a federal Court . . . .166 
The judges dispatched their declaration to the North Carolina General 
Assembly.167 In an accompanying letter, the judges characterized the 
Morris certiorari as a circumstance “which required . . . that they should 
then surrender to the Judiciary of the United States a controuling power 
over the Supreme Judiciary of this State, or refuse to comply with what 
they unanimously conceived to be an unconstitutional Mandate of the 
Judges of the Fœderal Court.”168 The judges wrote that they had hoped to 
avoid such a “clashing between the Judiciaries of the United States” but 
that “[t]he duties they owe to their Country at large [i.e., North Carolina], 
and to themselves as Men” dictated noncompliance.169 In fact one of the 
judges, staunch Antifederalist Samuel Spencer, had predicted just such an 
interjurisdictional clash during North Carolina’s ratification debates.170 The 
state’s assembly, still flush with Antifederalist sentiment, rushed to applaud 
the judges’ defiance.171 
Apart from the somewhat inflammatory character of the state court 
reaction, one must recognize that the judges’ declaration had substantial 
persuasive force. It highlighted three elements of the certiorari’s issuance 
that seemed most vulnerable: (1) it sought to remove a proceeding that had 
long been pending in state court and thus lay outside the scope of any 
statutory grants of removal jurisdiction, (2) it was pursued by the plaintiffs, 
whereas the removal statute authorized only defendants to remove, and 
(3) it branded the state courts as inferior to an intermediate federal court.172 
Indeed, so persuasive was the response that one of those who signed the 
certiorari, Justice John Blair from Virginia, wrote an anguished letter to his 
 
166 See id. at 111–13 (footnote omitted). The Declaration recites that the term of court ended on 
“Saturday last,” or on November 13, 1790, and that the marshal delivered the certiorari during that 
term, which allows us to conclude that the writ was likely served in the first two weeks of November. 
See id. at 111. 
167 See Letter from Judges of the Superior Court of N.C. to the Gen. Assembly of N.C. (between 
Nov. 19 and Nov. 30, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 110–11. 
168 Id. at 110. 
169 Id. 
170 See Samuel Spencer, Remarks at the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption 
of the Federal Constitution (July 28, 1788), in 4 DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 67, 
at 136 (“I have objections to [Article III, Sections 1 and 2] . . . . I would wish that the federal court 
should not interfere, or have anything to do with controversies to the decision of which the state 
judiciaries might be fully competent . . . .”). During the ratification debates, Spencer predicted that 
“[t]here will be, without any manner of doubt, clashings and animosities between the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts and of the state courts, so that they will keep the country in hot water.” Id. at 136–37. 
171 See Resolution of the General Assembly of North Carolina (Dec. 15, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra 
note 9, at 117, 117–18 (“Resolved, that the General Assembly do commend and approve of the Conduct 
of the Judges of the Courts of law & Courts of Equity in this particular.”). 
172 See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 111–12. 
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colleagues some months later, expressing his doubts as to the propriety of 
the writ’s issuance.173 
For all its rhetorical power, however, the state court declaration 
notably failed to object to the simple fact of federal equitable relitigation of 
state court judgments.174 The declaration clearly contemplated that such 
relitigation was in the offing; the North Carolina court observed that the 
proceeding in the state court of equity was fairly advanced and had been 
the subject of several “decretal” orders.175 The judges’ declaration thus 
contemplated equitable relitigation in federal court and argued that such 
relitigation was improper, not because it would violate state norms of res 
judicata, but because federal law did not allow the transfer of a pending 
action like Morris’s to federal court through the issuance of certiorari. 
2. National Reaction to the Morris Certiorari.—News of the state–
federal clash spread quickly through the republic.176 Newspapers in North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania (by then, the seat of the federal government), and 
Virginia printed the North Carolina judges’ defiant declaration.177 In 
Richmond, Virginia, the declaration appeared under the following heading: 
A copy of the declaration of the Judges of the state of North-Carolina and by 
them annexed to, and returned with, a writ of certiorari, issuing out of the 
Federal Circuit Court of the district of North-Carolina, commanding the said 
 
173 See supra note 127 (excerpting Justice Blair’s letter to Justice Wilson). 
174 Of course, North Carolina judges may have been offended by a proposed injunction, even one 
aimed at the parties. While an injunction that sought in effect to relitigate a state court judgment would 
not convey the same direct message of judicial inferiority as a writ of certiorari aimed at the court itself, 
one must recognize that the injunction alone could have raised state judicial hackles. We are grateful to 
Professor Alison LaCroix for suggesting this explanation. 
175 See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 112. 
176 This eruption of Antifederalist sentiment in North Carolina occurred in November 1790, barely 
three months after the U.S. House of Representatives ordered Attorney General Edmund Randolph to 
prepare a report “on such matters relative to the administration of justice under the authority of the 
United States, as may require to be remedied” and on “such provisions in the respective cases as he 
shall deem advisable.” RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122 (quoting H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 289 (1790)); see also 2 DSHC, supra note 9, at 92 n.4. Randolph received his marching orders on 
August 5, 1790, and on that same day, he contacted Justice Wilson for assistance in preparing the 
Report. See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 122; RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 123 n.10; 4 DHSC, 
supra note 9, at 535–36 (reprinting the letter from Randolph to Wilson). As a signatory of the Morris 
certiorari, Justice Wilson was no doubt acutely aware of the fallout in North Carolina. For a discussion 
of Randolph’s resulting Report and its influence on the language of the AIA, see infra Part III.A. 
177 See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 112 n.1, 113 n.4; Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra 
note 14, at 112. Although the state judges issued their declaration in November 1790, newspapers 
reprinted the document well into 1791. See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 112; 
2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 112 n.1; see, e.g., North Carolina—In Senate, December, 1790, U.S. 
GAZETTE (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, at 760 (reprinting a portion of the North Carolina General Assembly 
resolution commending the defiance of its state judges). 
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Judges to certify to the said Federal Court, a cause depending before them, in 
the Court of Equity, for the district of Edenton.178 
By mid-December 1790, an abbreviated report had reached the nation’s 
capital, highlighting the state court’s concerns: 
That though they were anxiously desirous, that no disagreement or 
misunderstanding might take place between the Judicial Authority of [North 
Carolina], and the tribunals established by the United States, concerning their 
respective rights, jurisdictions and prerogatives yet they conceived it their 
indispensible duty, which they owed to the citizens of the State, pursuant to 
their oath of office, not to obey, or comply with, the mandate of the afore-
mentioned writ.179 
A short time later, Congressman John Steele of North Carolina sent 
President Washington copies of both the declaration of the North Carolina 
state judges and the resolution of that state’s assembly.180 A few days later 
President Washington asked Attorney General Edmund Randolph for his 
thoughts on the matter.181 On January 6, 1791, House member Fisher Ames 
sent word of the case back home to Massachusetts.182 
Despite the hubbub, no immediate congressional response to the 
Morris certiorari was forthcoming. It was, after all, still a Federalist 
legislative body; sympathies may have divided between the federal interest 
in unbiased adjudication and the expressions of state umbrage.183 Senator 
Robert Morris himself remained a powerful member of the Pennsylvania 
delegation and a close friend of the President.184 Although Morris would 
 
178 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 112 n.1 (reprinting material from the Virginia Gazette, and General 
Adviser dated June 1, 1791). 
179 Edenton, (N.C.) November 19, from a Correspondent, PA. MERCURY, & UNIVERSAL 
ADVERTISER, Dec. 14, 1790, at 3. 
180 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 130 n.1. In his letter, Steele described the North Carolina General 
Assembly’s reaction as “a premeditated attempt to draw that state into a contest with the Union.” Letter 
from John Steele, U.S. Representative, to George Washington, President of the United States (Jan. 4, 
1791), in 7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 181, 181 (Jack D. Warren, Jr. ed., 1998). 
181 See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 130 n.1 (citing Letter from Tobias Lear, President Washington’s 
personal secretary, to Edmund Randolph (Jan. 8, 1791)). President Washington’s correspondence came 
barely one week after Randolph submitted his Report on the federal judiciary to Congress. See 4 DHSC, 
supra note 9, at 142. 
182 See Letter from Fisher Ames, Representative from Mass., to Thomas Dwight, attorney from 
Springfield, Mass. (Jan. 6, 1791), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 124, 124–25 (footnote omitted) (“Please 
to mention this affair to [John Worthington, an attorney from Springfield, Massachusetts] & to my 
friend [John] Hooker[, another Springfield attorney] . . . .”). 
183 The first Congress was, in many ways, a continuation of the constitutional convention that gave 
rise to it. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–
1801, at 3–4 (1997). 
184 See RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789–1817, at 63 (1920) (describing 
Morris’s role, along with fellow Senators Oliver Ellsworth, George Cabot, Caleb Strong, and Rufus 
King, in procuring the Jay Treaty of 1794 and observing that “[f]ive more powerful men could not be 
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soon signal a desire to abate the federal action and proceed in state court, 
senatorial courtesy may have slowed any call to arms.185 In any case, the 
Morris proceeding was fundamentally a dispute between courts and was 
just getting underway; perhaps the courts would hit upon a solution. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the House had invited Edmund 
Randolph to submit a report on the federal judiciary, and he would do so on 
December 30, 1790—more than a month after the state court’s response 
brought the Morris certiorari to national attention.186 We think Randolph’s 
Report represents the first step in what was to become the AIA. 
III. DRAFTING THE AIA 
A. Randolph’s Report 
Randolph’s Report contained a proposed judiciary bill that bore 
striking textual similarities to the AIA and that would have solved the 
problems revealed by Morris. These clues, combined with the fact that the 
Report came so close on the heels of the headline-making 
interjurisdictional clash that erupted following the Morris certiorari, 
suggest that Randolph’s Report was at least in part a reaction to Morris and 
that it in turn laid the groundwork for the anti-injunction provision of the 
Judiciary Act of 1793: the AIA. 
A few short months before the circuit court issued its controversial 
certiorari in Morris, the House invited Attorney General Edmund Randolph 
to prepare a report on improvements that might be made to the still-infant 
federal judiciary.187 Whatever hopes House members may have harbored, 
Randolph’s Report did not provide useful tools for overhauling the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.188 Historians have proposed a range of explanations 
for the Report’s apparent lack of impact: the complex politics of the day; 
the reluctance of Congress to embrace radical reform of a judicial system 
that, though regarded as a temporary expedient, appeared to be functioning 
 
selected from the Senators of that period”); 9 ROBERT MORRIS, THE PAPERS OF ROBERT MORRIS, 1781–
1784, at xxxiii (Elizabeth M. Nuxoll & Mary A. Gallagher eds., 1999). 
185 See Letter from John Sitgreaves, Judge of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of N.C., to James 
Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court (Aug. 2, 1791) [hereinafter Sitgreaves Letter], in 2 DHSC, 
supra note 9, at 196, 197 (footnote omitted) (“[W]ith respect to the Certiorari [Morris’s attorney] Mr. 
[John] Hamilton informed Judge Blair and myself that Mr. Morris has desired him not to urge it further, 
that as he was a Member of the Legislature of the United States, from motives of Delicacy he wou’d 
rather the Cause shou’d be proceeded on in the State Court . . . .”). It is not clear why Morris’s case 
remained on the federal docket until 1793 despite the state court’s refusal to send up the record. See 2 
DHSC, supra note 9, at 239 n.6. 
186 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122, 127–67. The House had requested a report on 
August 5, 1790. See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 122 & n.2. North Carolina’s angry response to the Morris 
certiorari came in November of the same year. See supra Part II.E.1. 
187 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122 & n.2; supra Part II.E.1. 
188 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122–27. 
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relatively well; and continuing discontent at the state level with reforms 
that would strengthen federal institutions.189 Perhaps most importantly, 
Randolph had embraced reform of the circuit-riding system; his judiciary 
act would have limited the Justices to their duties on the Supreme Court 
and would have shifted the burden of circuit riding to the district judges.190 
So long as the Court’s appellate docket remained relatively light—and the 
Court as such had scant judicial business for the first few years—it was 
difficult to persuade Congress of the need to relieve the Justices of the 
burdens of circuit riding.191 The House referred the Report to a committee 
from which it never emerged.192 
Although it failed as a blueprint for judicial reform, Randolph’s 
Report provides important evidence that the Morris certiorari helped to 
highlight concerns with overlapping state and federal jurisdiction, thus 
linking the Morris proceeding to the eventual adoption of the AIA.193 
Randolph explained that his principal goal in preparing his Report was to 
solve the problem of jurisdictional overlap and conflict.194 He would have 
done so by demarcating certain matters of exclusive federal cognizance and 
leaving the remainder within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state and 
federal courts.195 As to these matters of concurrent jurisdiction, Randolph 
would offer litigants a choice: they could proceed in state court and abide 
 
189 See id. at 124–27. 
190 See id. at 123. 
191 Scholars overlook the significance of the cost factor in assessing Congress’s willingness to staff 
the federal circuit courts with circuit judges and to relieve Supreme Court Justices of the burden of 
riding circuit. The Justices were paid an annual salary that included an allowance for their expected 
travel expenses and they had, as yet, little work to do as members of the Court. See James E. Pfander, 
Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 19–21, 48 & n.245 (2008). Congress may have understandably wished to wait until the Court’s own 
docket filled before relieving the Justices of circuit duties that were, as a practical matter, their most 
significant judicial assignments. The Justices’ deference to Congress on issues of reform makes a good 
deal more sense when one recognizes that the issue was primarily one of ways and means. Cf. JUSTIN 
CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT (2012) (expressing puzzlement as to why the Justices in the early republic tended to 
defer to Congress on the issue of judicial reform). 
192 See H. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 465 (1791), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ll/llhj/001/
0400/04590465.tif; RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 126 n.26. 
193 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 127. For example, in the short-lived Judiciary Act of 
1801, Congress conferred general federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts and abolished 
the circuit-riding duties of the Justices and thus took two pages from Randolph’s Report. Id. In addition, 
as noted above, some scholars regard the Report as a likely precursor to the Anti-Injunction Act, which 
was adopted two years later in Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793. See supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
194 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 128–29 (stating that the “first object of this duty is to 
suggest any defects existing in the judiciary system” and arguing that some “classes of jurisdiction” 
must, by their nature, “shut[] out the jurisdiction of the state courts, as such, on the vital principles of 
the Union”). 
195 See id. at 129–31. 
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the result, without any prospect of review in the Supreme Court;196 or they 
could initiate their actions in, or remove them to, federal court, where the 
Supreme Court would have the ultimate say about the resolution of the 
case.197 (By barring federal review of state judgments, Randolph would 
have left intact state court decisions invalidating federal statutes or 
misapplying federal treaties.198 This potentially controversial feature of his 
plan may have supplied the intellectual foundation for the arguments of 
Virginia’s lawyers in such cases as Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee199 and 
Cohens v. Virginia.200) 
Although Randolph did not mention the Morris litigation by name, his 
Report would have provided a straightforward solution to the problem 
presented by the case.201 Morris chose to file in state court and would have 
been obliged to abide the choice. Even if Morris were to succeed in 
litigating his action in federal court, invoking its concurrent jurisdiction 
over disputes between citizens of different states, Randolph’s legislation 
would have barred the federal court from granting an injunction against the 
enforcement of the Hancock judgment, a ruling of the North Carolina state 
court. As Randolph explained in his notes on the jurisdiction conferred to 
federal district courts, courts of equity frequently interposed to entertain 
equitable defenses to suits that began in courts of law.202 He did not mean to 
debar such equitable involvement, but he objected to “throwing the 
common law side . . . into the state courts, and the equity side into the 
federal courts.”203 
Randolph’s concern with federal equitable interposition connects his 
Report to the Morris certiorari. The Report, in turn, anticipated and may 
have provided a template for the terms of the AIA as enacted some two 
years later. Indeed, two textual clues suggest a strong link between 
Randolph’s Report and the 1793 Act. First, the anti-injunction language in 
the two documents bears a striking resemblance.204 Compare Randolph’s 
 
196 See id. at 133. 
197 See id. at 133–34. 
198 See id. at 133. 
199 See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816) (“It is further argued, that no great public mischief can 
result from a construction which shall limit the appellate power of the United States to cases in their 
own courts . . . , because congress must have an unquestionable right to remove all cases within the 
scope of the judicial power from the state courts to the courts of the United States, at any time before 
final judgment, though not after final judgment.”). 
200 See 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 320 (1821). 
201 In an intriguing development, Randolph chose certiorari as the mechanism for the removal of 
actions from state to federal court, choosing the same mode for removal that Morris had attempted. See 
RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 132–33, 142, 149, 153, 154, 155. Randolph’s choice nicely 
confirms the understanding that the common law writ of certiorari would issue to remove an action 
either for review of the proceedings below or for further proceedings on the merits in the higher court. 
202 See id. at 162–63. 
203 Id. at 163. 
204 Part III.C explores one subtle textual difference that we regard as significant. 
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prohibition (“[a]nd no injunction in equity shall be granted by a district 
court to a judgment at law of a state court”205) with the language of the 
1793 AIA: “nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in 
any court of a state.”206 The AIA went further than Randolph urged by 
prohibiting all federal interference (rather than that by specified courts) and 
by applying to interference with state proceedings (rather than only state 
judgments).207 But the provisions otherwise bear a family resemblance. 
Second, both documents addressed the injunction in close proximity to the 
writ of ne exeat—a quasi-injunctive equitable writ.208 Randolph’s Report 
addressed the two writs in successive paragraphs;209 the 1793 Act combined 
its treatment of both writs in Section 5.210 No wonder Professor Charles 
Warren concluded that the Report was the obvious and undoubted 
precursor to the AIA.211 
Critics of Warren’s conclusion advance arguments that we find 
unpersuasive. Taylor and Willis describe Randolph’s proposed amendment 
as “of much more limited scope . . . , inasmuch as it operated only upon the 
district courts, applied only to judgments at law . . . , and was merely 
 
205 Id. at 142. 
206 Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335. 
207 The use of “proceedings” (rather than “judgments”) brought the AIA closer to the language of 
the 1790 Act, which stated that the “records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall 
have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or 
usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.” Act of May 26, 
1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, 122 (emphasis added). 
208 Black defines the writ of ne exeat as “an equitable writ ordering the person to whom it is 
addressed not to leave the jurisdiction of the court or the state.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1131 (9th 
ed. 2009). The writ is typically “issued to ensure the satisfaction of a claim against the defendant,” id., 
and as such is “frequently termed an equitable bail.” Id. at 1132 (quoting WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, 
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 21 (2d ed. 1956)). Others describe the writ of ne exeat as “an unusual 
hybrid—a quasi-criminal blend of injunctive relief, indirect civil contempt and other forms of . . . civil 
arrest” that, if likened to an animal species, “would probably bear the closest resemblance to the duck-
billed platypus, an unusual animal . . . fittingly described as ‘one of nature’s oddest creatures, seemingly 
assembled from the spare parts of other animals.’” Anthony E. Rebollo, The Civil Arrest and 
Imprisonment of Taxpayers: An Analysis of the Writ of Ne Exeat Republica, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 103, 156 
(2010) (quoting Susan Brown, Top Billing for Platypus at End of Evolution Tree, 453 NATURE 138, 138 
(2008)). 
209 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 141–42 (paragraphs 3 and 4). 
210 Section 5 reads as follows: 
And be it further enacted, That writs of ne exeat and of injunction may be granted by any judge of 
the supreme court in cases where they might be granted by the supreme or a circuit court; but no 
writ of ne exeat shall be granted unless a suit in equity be commenced, and satisfactory proof shall 
be made to the court or judge granting the same, that the defendant designs quickly to depart from 
the United States; nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a 
state; nor shall such writ be granted in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse 
party, or his attorney, of the time and place of moving for the same. 
1 Stat. at 334–35 (footnote omitted). 
211 See Warren, supra note 4, at 347 (“[The AIA provision of the Judiciary Act of 1793] was 
undoubtedly made in consequence of a report by Attorney General Edmund Randolph to the House of 
Representatives, December 27, 1790, as to desirable changes in the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . .”). 
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procedural in purpose.”212 We find the first argument mystifying; the 
authors must have overlooked the fact that Randolph’s proposed statute 
included separate sections that would have curtailed the power of both the 
district courts and the circuit courts in precisely the same terms.213 
Randolph appended his explanatory note to the district court provision, but 
its criticism of federal equitable interposition would surely have applied 
with equal force to his proposed restriction of circuit court power.214 To be 
sure, the AIA would operate more economically with a simple prohibition 
against the issuance of writs of injunction without specifying a particular 
court. But Randolph proposed to qualify the authority of both federal 
courts. 
As for the other supposed distinctions, we doubt that they disprove the 
connection that Warren identified. True, the AIA applies more broadly than 
Randolph’s proposed amendment. The AIA’s term “proceedings,” in 
contrast to Randolph’s “judgments at law,”215 was broad enough to 
foreclose equitable interposition in pending state court actions at law, in 
equity, before probate courts, and so forth. What’s more, the AIA’s term 
“proceedings” would prohibit interposition at any stage of the state court 
litigation, rather than simply banning only a stay of “judgments” rendered 
by a state court of law. In evaluating the significance of these disparities, it 
bears noting that scholarly accounts of colonial North Carolina practice and 
other sources suggest that the most common form of equitable interposition 
was that aimed at proceedings at law.216 Moreover, the expansion of the 
AIA prohibition did not alter the functional quality of the protection offered 
to state courts. As we noted above, courts of equity could enjoin an action 
at law at any time, from the point of the action’s first initiation (if based, 
for instance, on a contract procured by fraud), to the point of judgment, and 
ultimately to the point of postjudgment efforts to execute the judgment.217 
Congress may have concluded that it could better capture all of these points 
in the litigation process by describing them as proceedings, without setting 
out to broaden or narrow the nature of the protection afforded. After all, 
Randolph’s provision would appear to prohibit an injunction if, in seeking 
 
212 Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 n.14 (emphasis omitted). 
213 See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 142 (“[N]o injunction in equity shall be granted by a 
district court to a judgment at law of a state court.”); id. at 149 (“[A]nd no injunction in equity shall be 
granted by a circuit court to a judgment at law of a state court.”). 
214 See id. at 142, 162–63. Notably, Randolph’s proposed statute would have expanded the power 
of the district courts to entertain equitable proceedings—something they lacked under the Judiciary Act 
of 1789. See id. at 141–42 (“Writs of injunction in equity, may be granted by the judge of a district 
court, to judgments of the said court at common law.”). It was not until 1807 that district courts came to 
have injunctive powers. See Act of Feb. 13, 1807, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 418 (“An Act to extend the power of 
granting writs of injunctions to the judges of the district courts of the United States.”). 
215 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
216 See Nelson, supra note 67, at 2147–48; infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
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to block postjudgment execution, it had the effect of staying a judgment at 
law, just as the AIA’s ban would block such interposition. 
We find ourselves equally perplexed by the characterization of 
Randolph’s provision as “merely procedural in purpose.”218 Randolph was 
not proposing a merely procedural unification of law and equity at the state 
level—he was rather proposing to end federal equitable relief against state 
court judgments. After the merger of law and equity (achieved in the courts 
of the United States through the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure),219 available remedies at law and in equity were to remain 
the same, and nothing of substance was to turn on the fact that the litigant 
was no longer obliged to pursue equitable relief in a “separate” court.220 
One can readily see the potential for what we might today term outcome-
determinative (that is, “substantive”) differences in the legal rules that state 
and federal courts would apply in that pre-Erie world.221 As the Morris case 
made clear, splitting a case into law and equity was one thing, but dividing 
it between state and federal courts was quite another. 
B. The Adoption of the AIA 
The AIA was enacted two years after the Randolph Report as part of 
the Judiciary Act of 1793,222 legislation that would respond in part to the 
Justices’ concerns with the burden and expense of circuit riding.223 
Although the Justices sought radical relief in the form of an elimination of 
their circuit duties (along the lines set forth in the Randolph Report), 
 
218 Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 n.14. 
219 FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
220 See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory committee’s notes (1937). For merger background, see Polly J. 
Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 811–17 (1998), which 
describes the merger of law and equity, beginning with the Field Code in 1848 and culminating in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
221 As early as 1792, Congress conferred power on the Court to promulgate rules of equity; the 
Court responded by declaring the equitable jurisprudence of England as applicable in the United States. 
See An Act for Regulating Processes in the Courts of the United States, and Providing Compensations 
for the Officers of the Said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses (Process Act of 1792), in 4 DHSC, 
supra note 9, at 182, 182 (allowing federal courts to adopt equity procedures “according to the 
principles, rules and usages which belong to Courts of equity . . . as contra-distinguished from Courts of 
common law . . . .”); Minutes of the Supreme Court (Aug. 8, 1792), in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 169, 
203 (proclaiming that the Court would henceforth “consider the practice of the Courts of Kings Bench 
and of Chancery in England as affording outlines” for its practice). 
Speaking for the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), Justice Frankfurter 
held that suits brought in equity were nonetheless subject to state statutes of limitation. Professor 
Collins has argued that Justice Frankfurter “dismissed a long line of precedent that suggested a different 
view of federal equitable power” and instead used Guaranty Trust as an opportunity to limit the use of 
federal equitable injunctions as “a means of suppressing labor strikes.” Kristin A. Collins, “A 
Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 
60 DUKE L.J. 249, 336–43 (2010). 
222 Judiciary Act of 1793, Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35. 
223 Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 333–34. 
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Congress was unwilling to go quite that far.224 Instead, Congress reduced 
the number of circuit courts and declared that a circuit court would consist 
of a district court judge and a single Justice, rather than two Justices as 
specified in the Judiciary Act of 1789.225 These reforms alone cut the 
burden of circuit riding (for Justices) by more than half. 
Other elements of the Act were aimed at filling gaps and addressing 
concerns associated with the advent of two-judge circuit courts. For 
example, the Act provided for certification of questions of law to the 
Supreme Court in cases where the two judges disagreed.226 In addition, 
Section 5 of the Act broadened the power of the circuit Justices to issue 
certain kinds of writs “out of court” that they had previously been 
authorized to issue only when acting as a court.227 This was, recall, the 
feature of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (with all writs power generally vested 
in courts but not judges) that had led Justice Rutledge to question his power 
to issue writs of certiorari and injunction on his own fiat in the Morris 
case.228 The Act of 1793 authorized a circuit Justice to issue the writs of 
ne exeat and injunction “in cases where they might be granted by the 
supreme or a circuit court.”229 Here, Congress was acting to empower a 
single Justice (but not a district judge) to grant emergency relief between 
court sessions when the threat of irreparable harm might make it 
inadvisable to wait until the full court could convene to hear the matter.230 
Section 5’s evident concern with empowering the single circuit Justice 
has misled some observers. Professor Mayton argued, echoed by Professor 
Holt, that the AIA limits only the power of single Justices—power 
previously conferred in Section 5—and leaves the injunctive power of 
courts intact.231 It is certainly true that the AIA appears immediately after 
 
224 See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 124–27 (discussing Congress’s reluctance to radically reform the 
federal judiciary); Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, President of the 
United States (Aug. 9, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 51–52 (Walter Lowrie 
& Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (seeking relief from circuit-riding 
duties); RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 134. 
225 § 1, 1 Stat. at 333–34. 
226 Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 334. 
227 See id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35. 
228 See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
229 § 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35. 
230 See Daniel M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of a Single Justice of the Supreme 
Court, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159, 1169–70 (2008) (citing Frank Felleman & John C. Wright, Jr., Note, 
The Powers of the Supreme Court Justice Acting in an Individual Capacity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 981, 
999, 1019 (1964)). 
231 See Holt, supra note 23, at 336 n.145; Mayton, supra note 5, at 331–32 (arguing that “Congress 
in 1793 did not enact an anti-injunction statute” but instead “enacted only a law prohibiting a single 
Justice of the Supreme Court from enjoining a state court proceeding”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, 
JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1030 (6th ed. 2009) (observing that Professor Mayton “marshals 
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the grants of power to the circuit Justices, but it does not follow that the 
general prohibition against injunctions was meant to qualify only the power 
of the single Justice. For starters, the unqualified language of the AIA, “nor 
shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a 
state,”232 would appear to apply broadly to any injunction at the federal 
level, be it issued by a court or a single Justice. 
The overall structure of Section 5 confirms that its broad limitation on 
injunctive power applies to both courts and judges. The Act of 1793 was 
drafted to confer writ-granting power on single Justices as a supplement to 
the all writs power conferred on courts in Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789.233 As we have seen, that provision empowered courts to issue writs 
only where necessary “for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions” and 
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.234 Section 5 incorporated all 
such limitations on the power to issue writs of injunction and ne exeat by 
specifying that the power of the single Justice comes into play only in cases 
“where they [i.e., the writs] might be granted by the supreme or a circuit 
court.”235 Since the power of courts was already limited in Section 14, 
similar limits would apply to circuit Justices. 
The drafters of Section 5 thus plainly had the all writs power of courts 
in view when they extended that writ-issuing power to circuit Justices. This 
clinches the argument for treating Section 5’s limits on issuance of writs as 
generally applicable to courts and judges. Consider Section 5’s restrictions 
on the ne exeat power, allowing issuance of this writ only where the 
complainant has commenced an action in equity and made a showing that 
the defendant intended to leave the United States.236 This restriction applies 
to writs granted by both courts and Justices; the statute itself recites that 
sufficient proof must be made to satisfy “the court or judge” granting the 
same.237 Section 5 then prohibited writs of injunction to stay state court 
proceedings in terms that paralleled the ne exeat limits and apparently 
applied without any limitation as to the issuing court or Justice.238 The 
provision did not need to specify which writ-granting authority it qualified. 
 
considerable support” for his view that the statute constrains only the power of a single Justice while 
riding circuit). 
232 § 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35. 
233 Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. 
234 Id. 
235 Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. One might argue that this limit on ne exeat power was unnecessary if Section 5 already 
incorporated the requirement that the writs issue only where necessary for the exercise of the court’s 
jurisdiction. But notably, courts of equity would sometimes grant ne exeat before the commencement of 
a suit in equity. One could argue that such a precommencement writ would be necessary to keep the 
defendant from leaving the jurisdiction and would thus satisfy the Section 14 requirement that it issue in 
aid of jurisdiction even though no action was pending. 
238 Id. 
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Nor did it need to specify that it meant to qualify the injunction-granting 
power of the district or circuit courts, as Randolph’s provisions had done.239 
As a general prohibition, it seemingly applied across the board to any 
federal court or Justice that could exercise injunction-granting power. 
C. “Writs of Injunction” 
Although a variety of factors thus link the language of Randolph’s 
Report to the ultimate passage of the AIA, one crucial difference separates 
the two provisions. Randolph’s anti-injunction provision simply declared 
that “no injunction in equity shall be granted by a district [or circuit] court 
to a judgment at law of a state court.”240 The final version of the AIA subtly 
modified that text, declaring instead that no “writ of injunction [shall] be 
granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state.”241 Such a change may 
not appear significant to the modern eye, but we think it had enormous 
significance for the expected operation of the AIA. As we shall see, rules of 
equity practice distinguished the “writ of injunction” (which issued 
following the filing and service of an original bill of injunction) from relief 
in the nature of an injunction. By forbidding only the issuance of writs of 
injunction, the drafters of the AIA left the federal courts free to provide 
injunctive relief as an ancillary remedy. In other words, where the federal 
court first obtained jurisdiction of a cause in equity, the AIA did not limit 
its power to grant injunctive relief to stay conflicting proceedings in state 
court and to protect and effectuate its decrees. 
1. A Brief Primer on the Writ of Injunction to Stay Legal 
Proceedings.—The distinction between original process by way of 
a writ of injunction and ancillary relief in the nature of an injunction seems 
to have arisen in the seventeenth century during Francis Bacon’s hitch as 
Chancellor. At that point, the most common form of injunction was one 
issued to stay proceedings at common law.242 Bacon understood that the 
practice had been controversial with common lawyers; he had headed up 
the royal commission that defended Chancellor Ellesmere’s power to stay 
 
239 See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing Randolph’s Report). 
240 RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 142. 
241 § 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35. 
242 See EDEN, supra note 79, at 9–10 (“AN injunction is a writ, issuing by the order and under the 
seal of a court of equity . . . amongst the most ordinary objects of which the following may be 
enumerated: To stay proceedings in courts of law, in the spiritual courts, the courts of admiralty, or in 
some other court of equity . . . .”); 1 TURNER, supra note 79, at 361 (“THE Writ of Injunction is granted 
by the Court in various Cases, and for various Purposes: It is frequently applied for to restrain a Party 
from proceeding at Law . . . .”); WYATT, supra note 18, at 231 (indicating, under the heading 
“Injunction,” that such writs were issued either to stay waste or “to stay a suit in some other court, as in 
a Court of Law, Court of Admiralty, an Ecclesiastical Court, or a Court of Equity”). 
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Lord Coke’s judgments in King’s Bench.243 When Bacon later took over as 
Chancellor, he issued a series of famous ordinances with procedural 
protections designed to make the issuance of stays less controversial.244 
Most relevant for our purposes, Bacon ordered that no writ of injunction to 
stay a common law action was to be granted on petition or motion alone.245 
Instead, Bacon required that the party seeking relief file a formal bill to 
commence an action in the Chancery.246 By requiring that parties initiate an 
original action by bill, Bacon guaranteed a series of important procedural 
protections including service of process on the opponent (by way of 
subpoena) and notice of both the allegations in the bill and the requested 
relief.247 
By the eighteenth century, these elements of practice in connection 
with writs of injunction to stay proceedings at law had become well 
established.248 Thus, in his Vinerian lectures of 1777, Richard Wooddesson 
 
243 On the importance of Bacon’s role as the head of the royal commission, see 5 WILLIAM S. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 231–38 (1966). For the text of Bacon’s report to King 
James, see The King’s Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 115, 21 Eng. Rep. 61 (1616).  
244 One change was to eliminate a race to the courthouse; some Chancellors were willing to enjoin 
actions at law whenever the equitable complainant was the first to file. See FRANCIS BACON, 
ORDINANCES MADE BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR BACON, FOR THE BETTER AND MORE REGULAR 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE CHANCERY, in 15 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 351, 356 
(James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis & Douglas Denon Heath eds., Boston, Brown & Taggard 1860) 
(Ordinance 21) (“No injunction to stay suits at the common law shall be granted upon priority of suit 
only . . . .”); EDEN, supra note 79, at 58 n.e (describing the prior willingness of equity to grant relief 
“merely upon priority of suit” and quoting Bacon as saying “that he did not mean to make it a matter of 
a horse race, who shall be first in Westminster Hall”). 
245 See BACON, supra note 244, at 353 (Ordinance 11) (stating that “[w]here causes come to a 
hearing in court, no decree bindeth any person who was not served with process . . . , according to the 
course of the court” or who did not appear). 
246 See id. at 358 (Ordinance 33) (allowing suits after judgment only where the complainant puts up 
a bond “with good sureties to prove the suggestions of the bill”); see also EDEN, supra note 79, at 70 
(“IT is directed both by Lord Bacon’s and Lord Clarendon’s orders, that no injunction for stay of suit 
should be granted or revived upon Petition.”). 
247 See LORD NOTTINGHAM, ‘MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE’ AND ‘PROLEGOMENA OF 
CHANCERY AND EQUITY’ 46 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965) (“The subpoena, when served, did not disclose the 
cause of action and the litigation was in effect initiated by the bill setting forth the grounds of 
complaint. The bill will be noticed later in connection with pleading: as to the procedure, however, the 
writ was the basis of the Court’s power to compel appearance and obedience.”). Nottingham compiled 
his manual during the period of his Lord Keepership, from November 1673 to December 1675. Id. at 6. 
This practice continued into the early nineteenth century. See 2 JOSEPH HARRISON, THE 
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 540–41 (John Newland ed., London, A. Strahan 1808) 
(“No injunction for stay of suit at law shall be granted, revived, dissolved, or stayed upon a petition, nor 
any injunction of any other nature pass by order upon petition without notice, and a copy of the petition 
first had by, or given to, the other side . . . .”). 
248 A writ form entitled “The Form of a Writ of Injunction,” printed in an early eighteenth-century 
English treatise, illustrates the practice: 
Whereas it hath been represented unto us, in our court of Chancery, on the part of [blank space], 
complainant, that he hath lately exhibited this bill of complaint into our said court of Chancery 
against you the said [blank space], defendant, to be relieved touching the matters therein 
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explained injunction proceedings as “those, in which the bill prays, besides 
the writ of subpoena to compel the defendant to appear and answer, a writ 
also of injunction, inhibiting him from suing the complainant at common 
law.”249 Wooddesson went on to explain “that he who seeks an injunction, 
should have a bill filed in court at the time.”250 Robert Eden’s early 
nineteenth-century treatise on the law of injunctions was to much the same 
effect. He explained that “[a]n injunction is a writ, issuing by the order and 
under the seal of a court of equity,” which seeks among other things “[t]o 
stay proceedings in courts of law, in the spiritual courts, the courts of 
admiralty, or in some other court of equity.”251 Eden also explained that 
practice on the writ of injunction required the complainant to file a bill, to 
include a request for the writ in the bill’s prayer, and to serve the bill on the 
defendant with the subpoena.252 A type of injunction called a “common 
injunction” might issue, on proof of service of the bill, if the defendant 
failed to answer or appear in court.253 
 
contained; and that you the said defendant being served with a writ, issuing out of our said court, 
commanding you to appear to and answer the said bill . . . ; and yet in the mean time you unjustly, 
as is alleged, prosecute the said complainant at law, touching the matters in the said bill 
complained of: We therefore, in consideration of the premises, do strictly enjoin and command 
you the said [blank space], and all and every the persons before mentioned under the penalty of 
two hundred pounds, . . . that you and every of you do absolutely desist from all farther 
proceedings at law against the said complainant . . . . 
Id. at 555–56. 
249 3 WOODDESSON, supra note 16 (footnote omitted). This is a revised edition of Wooddesson’s A 
Systematical View of the Laws of England: As Treated of in a Course of Vinerian Lectures, Read at 
Oxford, During a Series of Years, Commencing in Michaelmas Term, 1777, first published in 1793. 
250 Id. 
251 EDEN, supra note 79, at 2, 10; see also MADDOCK, supra note 78, at *107–08 (recognizing that 
chancery can stay proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts and courts of admiralty); WOODDESSON, 
supra note 16, at 163 (footnotes omitted) (“And by injunction proceedings may be stayed in another 
court of equity, or in the admiralty or ecclesiastical courts, as well as those of common law.”). 
252 EDEN, supra note 79, at 70–71, 73–83. A money deposit was also required, where the 
complainant sought to enjoin a judgment at law. WYATT, supra note 18, at 238 (“Where there is a 
verdict at law, and the defendant exhibits his bill for relief, the money must be deposited before an 
injunction will be granted.”). 
Bills of injunction, so called, were special in that they specifically asked for injunctive relief in 
their prayer, instead of asking more generally for whatever relief the court should deem just and proper. 
See COOPER, supra note 75, at 13–14; EDEN, supra note 79, at 73–74; HARRISON, supra note 247, at 
539 (“An injunction cannot be granted, but where it is expressly prayed by the bill; the prayer for 
general relief does not extend to an injunction.”); id. at 548 (recognizing that the validity of an 
injunction depends upon its being served on the defendant); 2 STORY, supra note 75, § 1183, at 553 
(noting that an injunction must be “specifically prayed for by the bill”); TURNER, supra note 79, at 361 
(“In order to ground the Application for the Writ, a Bill must be filed, praying for an Injunction, and 
such other Relief as the Case requires.”); WYATT, supra note 18, at 233 (“Neither can [an injunction] be 
granted, unless prayed for by the bill, and the prayer of general relief does not extend to an 
injunction.”). 
253 See EDEN, supra note 79, at 121; HARRISON, supra note 247, at 541, 543 (defining the common 
injunction); 2 STORY, supra note 75, § 1215, at 571 (same); TURNER, supra note 242, at 361 (footnote 
omitted) (“If the Injunction required is to stay Proceedings at Law, the common Injunction of the Court 
will be granted, either for Want of an Appearance, in due Time after Service and Return of the 
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Apart from this formal practice in connection with writs of injunction, 
Eden also recognized that equity would, in certain specified cases, grant 
ancillary relief “in the nature of an injunction” upon motion without 
requiring the complainant to file a bill for a writ of injunction.254 First, he 
pointed to a situation in which the court of equity had issued a decree for 
the administration of assets.255 If a creditor of the estate under 
 
Subpoena, or for Want of an Answer. If for Want of an Appearance, an Affidavit of the Service of the 
Subpoena must be made . . . .”); see also 3 EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE 
OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 275 (London, J. & W.T. Clarke 1837) (distinguishing “common 
injunctions” from “special injunctions”); EDEN, supra note 79, at 83–86 (describing four situations in 
which an injunction might issue following filing and service of the bill). Thus it was possible for an 
injunction to issue before the defendant’s filing of an answer, in order to preserve the status quo. See 
WYATT, supra note 18, at 233 (“If it be granted before answer, it is commonly till answer and further 
order.”). If the defendant answered and denied the bill’s equity, the court would dissolve the injunction 
absent a showing of good cause by the plaintiff. See EDEN, supra note 79, at 115; TURNER, supra note 
79, at 370; WYATT, supra note 18, at 234; id. at 242 (“If an injunction is dissolved, yet if there be cause 
it may be revived on motion.”). 
Although the common injunction would stay execution of a judgment, it did not absolutely bar 
further proceedings at law. See HARRISON, supra note 247, at 546 (“An injunction to stay trial cannot 
be had in the first instance. The common injunction must be had, and then a motion to extend it to stay 
trial.”). An early English writ formulary included in Joseph Harrison’s 1808 treatise makes this clear. 
The form provides that the “defendant is at liberty to call for a plea, and to proceed to trial thereon; and 
for want of a plea, to enter up judgment; but execution is hereby stayed.” Id. at 555–56. 
254 1 ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS, AND 
OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS IN THE NATURE OF INJUNCTIONS 71-3 n.3 (3d ed. New York, Banks, 
Gould & Co. 1852); see EDEN, supra note 79, at 71; see also HARRISON, supra note 247, at 544 
(“Though it is said . . . that the defendant could not have an injunction, because he had no bill filed; yet 
where [a pending suit revealed equities favoring the defendant], the court granted an injunction on the 
defendant’s application, though he had no bill filed.”); W.J. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF 
CHANCERY 184 (1967) (observing that during Elizabethan times, “the bulk of these writs [of injunction 
to stay proceedings at law] were only obtained after the bill had been filed” but noting two ways of 
obtaining injunctive relief: “It could be requested in a bill of complaint along with a subpoena, or it 
could be asked for by information or motion, once proceedings in Chancery had begun”); 2 STORY, 
supra note 75, § 1216, at 572; TURNER, supra note 79, at 377 (recognizing limits on the ability of a 
court of equity to grant ancillary relief pursuant to an earlier decree). 
Although Eden recognized a distinction between writs of injunction and ancillary relief in the 
nature of an injunction, he noted that the distinction was often disregarded in practice. See 2 STORY, 
supra note 75, § 1181, at 549 n.1 (“In many cases [equity] enforces it by means of the process of the 
writ of injunction, properly so called. But [Eden] proceeds to remark: . . . [‘T]he prohibition has in 
numerous cases been issued and conveyed in the shape merely of an order in the nature of an 
injunction. . . . The distinction is consequently disregarded in practice, and these orders, though not 
enforced by means of the writ of injunction, have indiscriminately obtained the name of injunctions.’” 
(citing ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 290 (London 1821))). The 
wearing down of formal distinctions between ancillary and original injunctive relief so early in our 
history, acknowledged by Eden and later Justice Story, goes a long way in explaining why the 
distinction has since been largely forgotten. 
255 See EDEN, supra note 79, at 71; see also 1 WILLIAM BROWN, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND 
DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY *183 n.2 (Robert Belt ed., 4th ed. London, A. Strahan 
1819) (reprinting Brooks v. Reynolds, (1782) 21 Eng. Rep. 406, 406; 1 Bro. C.C. 183; 2 Dick. 603) (“In 
all cases . . . where the Court has, by decree, taken upon itself the administration of assets, it will now 
restrain parties suing the executor at law; and it now is unnecessary to file a separate bill for such 
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administration later initiated a suit at law claiming title to the assets, the 
court of equity would stay the proceeding on motion, rather than on bill 
filed.256 Relief by motion was also available where the plaintiff had filed 
two actions, one in law and one in equity, for the same claim. Equity would 
require the plaintiff to elect his remedy; if he chose the equitable path, the 
plaintiff would be enjoined as a matter of course from pursuing the action 
at law.257 Third, relief by motion would issue when the plaintiff had 
pursued equitable relief without success and later sought to relitigate the 
matter by filing a duplicative action at law.258 Early cases suggest that such 
ancillary injunctive relief came in the form of an “order” of injunction, as 
distinguished from the traditional “writ” of injunction.259 
These exceptions, which allowed a party to pursue ancillary equitable 
relief without filing a formal bill for a writ of injunction, have a good deal 
in common. For starters, they applied to situations in which a proceeding 
was first commenced in a court of equity and a subsequent action was 
brought in a court of law. Because the parties were already before the court 
of equity, there was no reason to insist on the commencement of a new 
action in equity with attendant service of process.260 In all of the situations 
 
purpose, since an injunction can be applied for in the existing suit.”); 2 STORY, supra note 75, § 1213, 
at 570 (noting that injunctions to prevent creditors from going to other tribunals to assert their rights 
were “formerly granted only upon a bill filed” but that injunctions “may now be obtained upon motion 
after notice given to the creditor”). 
256 See EDEN, supra note 79, at 54, 71; see also Paxton v. Douglas, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 456, 456; 
8 Ves. 520, 520 (“[T]his Court has made a decree for administration of assets, that decree is in nature of 
a judgment for all creditors. The decree cannot be pleaded at law; and therefore . . . if a bill was filed, 
the Court has been in the habit of enjoining any creditor.”); 1 TURNER, supra note 79 at 374–75 (noting 
the same exception). 
257 See EDEN, supra note 79, at 57, 71. An early English case confirms this practice. See Jones v. 
Earl of Strafford (1730) 3 P. Wms. 80, 90 (recognizing that the plaintiff must make an election as 
between pursuing a claim in law or equity and noting that if the plaintiff elects to proceed in chancery, 
“then the proceedings at law are by that order to be stayed by injunction”). 
258 See EDEN, supra note 79, at 58–59, 71; NOTTINGHAM, supra note 247, at 83 (“No injunctions 
for stay of suits at law are to be granted, revived, dissolved or stayed upon petition . . . . And I think fit 
to add a further qualification, vizl. that injunctions to stay suits at law which are commenced contrary 
unto the decrees of the Court may be granted at any time upon petition and in time of vacation.”); id. at 
147–48 (“Injunctions to stay suits at law contrary to the decrees of the Court may be granted at any 
time, and upon petition in the time of vacation.”). 
An early English case illustrates this practice. In Brooks v. Reynolds, the Chancellor observed 
that where a decree had been made to take account of debts owed and to pay them from the estate, such 
that the creditors would have satisfaction under the decree, “he would not permit the defendant to 
proceed at law, which would be rendering the decree nugatory.” 21 Eng. Rep. at 406. On those grounds, 
the Chancellor granted an injunction to stay proceedings at law. Id. 
259 See Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns. Ch. 609 (N.Y. 1820); Dove v. Dove, (1783) 21 Eng. Rep. 
411; Dick. 617; 1 Bro. 375; 1 Cox, 101 S.C. 
260 WYATT, supra note 18, at 231 (“It is commonly by writ founded on an order of [the court of 
chancery]; but may be by word of mouth when the party to be inhibited is actually present in court.”). 
A similar result obtained in an early New York chancery decision involving a decree and judicial 
sale of mortgaged property. In Kershaw v. Thompson, Chancellor Kent considered the question 
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described, moreover, relief by motion was necessitated by a gap in the 
doctrine of claim preclusion. As Eden explained, courts of law refused to 
take “notice of a decree in equity.”261 As a consequence, a court of equity 
could only ensure the effectiveness of its decrees by granting injunctive 
relief against inconsistent legal proceedings.262 Eden explained the matters 
in terms of the protection or effectuation of equitable authority; courts of 
equity were compelled “in support of their jurisdiction, to establish their 
decrees by injunction.”263 Eden’s phrasing of the matter anticipates the 
forms of ancillary relief that the federal courts would later recognize as 
having survived the AIA’s adoption. 
2. The Original–Ancillary Distinction and the AIA.—The AIA 
appears to pick up the original–ancillary distinction from equity practice, 
barring the issuance of “writs of injunction” but saying nothing to foreclose 
ancillary relief. While we have yet to find any contemporaneous statements 
that describe the Act in precisely these terms, we think that lawyers of the 
day would have understood the implications of the AIA’s careful wording. 
 
whether, after declaring the parties’ rights to the mortgaged property, a court of equity could also order 
relief in the nature of an injunction requiring the mortgagor to deliver possession of the property, or 
whether the purchaser would have to file a separate ejectment action at law. Kent explained: 
It does not appear to consist with sound principle, that the Court, which has exclusive authority to 
foreclose the equity of redemption of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in interest before it, 
and decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be able even to put the purchaser into 
possession against one of the very parties to the suit, and who is bound by the decree. . . . The 
distribution of power among the Courts would be injudicious, and the administration of justice 
exceedingly defective, and chargeable with much useless delay and expense, if it were necessary 
to resort, in the first instance, to a Court of equity, and, afterwards, to a Court of law, to obtain a 
perfect foreclosure of a mortgage. . . . [I]t may be safely laid down as a general rule, that the 
power to apply the remedy is coextensive with the jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
Kershaw, 4 Johns. Ch. at 612–18. Early treatises confirm the use of an “order” of injunction to deliver 
possession of land following a decree. See BACON, supra note 244, at 353 (Ordinance 9) (“In case of a 
decree made for the possession of land, . . . if he persist in disobedience, an injunction is to be granted 
for the possession; and in case also that be disobeyed, then a commission to the sheriff to put him into 
possession.”); NOTTINGHAM, supra note 247, at 134–35 (“After affidavit of service and non 
performance, there follow of course attachment . . . then an injunction for the possession. . . . 
[Thereafter,] in case of resistance a writ of Assistance is to go to the sheriff.”); 2 STORY, supra note 75, 
§ 1291, at 637 & n.1 (citing Kershaw and explaining that “Courts of Equity also interfere and effectuate 
their own decrees in many cases by injunctions in the nature of a judicial writ or execution for 
possession of the property in controversey; as for example by injunctions to . . . deliver . . . possession, 
followed up by a writ of assistance”). 
261 EDEN, supra note 79, at 54; see also 28 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 4410. An early English 
chancery case illustrates the problem. See Morrice v. Bank of Eng., (1736) 36 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ch.); Cas. 
t. Talbot 217, 223; 3 Swanst. 573; 2 Bro. P.C. (Toml. ed.) 465. Morrice explained: “[I]t is clear that a 
Decree of this Court, if an Action is brought against an Executor on a Bond, is not pleadable, nor can be 
given in Evidence against it [in a court of law].” Id. If the chancery court were to have “any 
Jurisdiction” then its decrees “must have the same Lien upon Assets as a Judgment at Law.” Id. Thus 
the court concluded that “a Decree prior in Time must be prefer’d to a subsequent Judgment” otherwise 
“this Court must give up its Jurisdiction.” Id. 
262 See EDEN, supra note 79, at 54. 
263 Id. 
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Indeed, we find that the Court’s own discussions of the equitable powers of 
the federal courts in the antebellum period appear to rest on the assumption 
that the AIA blocks only original writs and leaves ancillary powers 
unconstrained.264 
D. Denouement 
1. Dismissal of Morris v. Allen.—Others have suggested that the 
AIA was designed to provide a legislative solution to the ongoing crisis 
triggered by the issuance of the Morris certiorari.265 A variety of factors 
support this hypothesis. The litigation remained alive on the circuit court’s 
docket through early 1793266 and was an ongoing source of embarrassment 
to Justice Iredell, whose appearance as a party to the Morris litigation 
disabled him from presiding as a judge over any follow-up proceedings.267 
Justice Iredell had brought this disability to the attention of the Chief 
Justice in seeking relief from his continuing assignments to the Southern 
Circuit.268 We also know that Justice Iredell’s brother-in-law, North 
Carolina Senator Samuel Johnston, had been especially solicitous of 
Iredell’s circuit burdens; Johnston had engineered the 1792 enactment of a 
provision that relieved Iredell of a disproportionate circuit assignment.269 
 
264 Our examination of the Court’s early applications of the AIA reveals that those situations in 
which federal courts were permitted to enjoin state proceedings, the supposedly judge-made 
“exceptions” to the AIA, are best understood as elaborations of the distinction between original and 
ancillary applications for the writ of injunction. See James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-
Injunction Act and the Problem of Federal–State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20–38 
(2013) (discussing ancillary exceptions and the rise of AIA “exceptions”).  
265 See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 202 n.9 (“It is possible this prohibition [i.e., the anti-injunction 
language] was inserted at the behest of Samuel Johnston, a member of the committee that drafted the 
bill, as the confrontation between federal and state court jurisdiction in North Carolina arising from the 
case of Morris v. Allen was still unresolved.”). 
266 Morris’s attorney John Hamilton discontinued the federal court action in June 1793. 2 DHSC, 
supra note 9, at 239 n.6. 
267 See supra note 137. 
268 See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 9; Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, 
to John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Jan. 17, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 238, 238 
(citing the pending Morris matter as a continuing reason why Iredell should not ride the Southern 
Circuit); Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to Thomas Johnson, Assoc. 
Justice of the Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 246, 246 (describing the 
Morris affair as a “peculiar hardship” counseling against Iredell’s traveling to the Southern Circuit). 
269 See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 248 n.6; Wythe Holt, Separation of Powers? Relations Between 
the Judiciary and the Other Branches of the Federal Government Before 1803, in NEITHER SEPARATE 
NOR EQUAL: CONGRESS IN THE 1790S, at 183, 197 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 
2000) (“[T]he justices . . . engaged in much informal lobbying to achieve desired changes in the 
judiciary laws. Iredell, for example, frequently dealt with his brother-in-law, Sen. Samuel Johnston of 
North Carolina, while Jay persistently exploited his close friendship with Sen. Rufus King of New 
York.”). The bill introduced by Senator Johnston on March 20, 1792, became law on April 13, 1792, as 
the Circuit Court Act of 1792. 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 248 n.6. 
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Johnston also served, with Oliver Ellsworth, on the Senate judiciary 
committee that formulated the AIA as part of the Act of 1793.270 
The AIA language, if tailored in part to provide a solution to the 
Morris certiorari controversy, certainly would have performed that office 
capably. It would not have directly addressed the power of a federal circuit 
court to issue writs of certiorari to the state courts, but it would have 
deprived the North Carolina federal circuit court of the power to grant a 
writ of injunction to stay the state court’s Hancock proceeding and would 
have thus required the discontinuance of the federal Morris action.271 Such 
an approach may have suited Justice Iredell well. While he could not sit in 
judgment in the Morris matter, he expressed concern lest the state’s defiant 
reaction to the issuance of the certiorari be left to stand as the final word on 
the subject.272 Such unresolved defiance might encourage recalcitrance by 
other states (as indeed it apparently had in South Carolina, where a similar 
set of events had played out273) and cast doubt on the breadth of federal 
judicial power. By banning the issuance of writs of injunction to stay 
proceedings in state court, Congress would compel the parties to 
discontinue the federal proceeding without necessitating any judicial 
resolution of the certiorari issue one way or the other. 
Morris dropped his federal court action in 1793,274 just a few months 
after the AIA became law,275 but it appears that he made the decision much 
earlier and for other reasons; perhaps he had grown sensitive to the 
concerns of the states as a member of the Senate. A letter dated 1791 
indicates that Morris asked his attorney “not to urge it further, that as he 
was a Member of the Legislature of the United States, from motives of 
Delicacy he wou’d rather the Cause shou’d be proceeded on in the State 
Court.”276 Thus ended the Morris tale. 
While the Morris litigation ended, the disputed power of the federal 
courts to issue writs of certiorari to the state courts apparently remained 
alive. Indeed, at least one other federal circuit relied on certiorari to effect 
 
270 See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 201 & n.4. 
271 In other words, Morris’s complaint (excerpted supra text accompanying note 91) was an 
original bill of injunction—just the sort that the AIA would foreclose. 
272 See Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to John Jay, Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court (Jan. 17, 1792), in 1 MCREE’S IREDELL, supra note 98, at 337, 338 (“To be sure the 
honor of the United States is deeply concerned in their courts deciding solemnly whether the writ issued 
erroneously, or ought to be enforced. It is of more importance that it should not go off by an act of 
defiance of the State Court, because the General Assembly of North Carolina in their session last 
Winter thanked the State Judges for their conduct in disobeying the Writ.”). 
273 See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 108 (discussing a “reprise” of the Morris debacle in March 
1793, when South Carolina state judges refused to comply with a certiorari issued by the federal circuit 
court). The case was Washington & Beresford v. Huger, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 360 (1794). 
274 See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 239 n.6. 
275 See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35. 
276 See Sitgreaves Letter, supra note 185, at 196–97. 
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removal of an action from state to federal court in much the way that 
Morris had done.277 To the extent that the AIA sought to address federal–
state tension without depriving the federal courts of certiorari power for use 
in appropriate circumstances, therefore, it appears that the legislation 
achieved its goal. 
2. The AIA in the Nineteenth Century.—If framed in the heat of a 
controversy over the Morris certiorari case, the AIA certainly had enduring 
ramifications. Convention holds that the Supreme Court first applied the 
AIA in its 1807 decision in Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott.278 There, the 
plaintiffs, Diggs and Keith, obtained a judgment against Wolcott in 
Connecticut state court.279 Wolcott, in turn, filed a bill of injunction in 
Connecticut state court, seeking to block enforcement of that judgment.280 
Diggs and Keith removed the state anti-suit action to the Connecticut 
federal circuit court,281 where Wolcott obtained a writ of injunction against 
the state judgment.282 Diggs and Keith appealed and the Supreme Court 
reversed.283 William Cranch, the Court’s reporter at the time, appears to 
have viewed the AIA as a factor in the dismissal; he reported the Court as 
having decided that the circuit court “had not jurisdiction to enjoin 
proceedings in a state court.”284 Although the Diggs Court did not mention 
the AIA by name, the wording of Cranch’s report285 has suggested to 
subsequent observers (as it does to us) that the dismissal was based on a 
finding that the AIA foreclosed the assertion of jurisdiction over actions to 
stay proceedings in state court.286 Indeed the Court itself cited Diggs as an 
 
277 See Washington & Beresford, 1 Des. Eq. at 361–62; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 108 
(discussing Washington & Beresford); Note, supra note 37, at 622 (same). 
278 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807). 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 As the defendants in equity, statutory removal was a route available to Diggs and Keith. Recall 
that Morris, the plaintiff in equity, had no such option and hence resorted to certiorari. See supra notes 
106–09 and accompanying text. 
282  Diggs, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 180. According to the clerk’s entry in the official minutes, available in the National 
Archives, the Supreme Court ruled for the defendants on the ground that the federal circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction “in this cause.” Appellate Case Files of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1792–1831 
(Feb. 26, 1807) (National Archives Microfilm Publication No. 215, file 230, roll 1) (on file with 
authors).  
285 A summary in the margin of the Cranch report states in its entirety: “A court of the United 
States cannot enjoin proceedings in a state court.” Diggs, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179. Compare that to the 
language of the AIA: “nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a 
state.” Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335. 
286 See Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 134 (1941) (“The early decisions of this Court 
applied the Act of 1793 as a matter of course.” (citing Diggs, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179)); id. at 134 n.5 
(“The first case arising under the [anti-injunction] provision was Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott . . . .”); Peck 
v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849) (citation omitted) (“The [1793 Act] declares that a writ of 
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early application of the AIA, in its 1849 decision Peck v. Jenness.287 Thus, 
it seems that parties relatively close in time to the Diggs disposition 
consistently read the Diggs dismissal as an apparent application of the AIA. 
Even if Diggs did not so hold (as others have argued288), the willingness of 
well-informed observers to treat the case as one to which the AIA was 
thought to apply may have some persuasive force. 
The conventional reading of Diggs comports with our account of the 
AIA. Indeed, Diggs was a virtual replay of the Morris v. Allen litigation: in 
an action removed from a state court of equity, a federal circuit court 
agreed to issue an original writ of injunction to stay proceedings in state 
court. But this time, the AIA stood in the way. What’s more, the Diggs 
decision may explain why the AIA received scant attention in the 
nineteenth century. Having foreclosed federal interposition in state court 
proceedings, the Court had clarified that the AIA barred original “writs of 
injunction.” 
Another nineteenth-century case, French v. Hay,289 reveals the flip side 
of the original–ancillary distinction. Said to be the first decision in which 
the Supreme Court recognized “exceptions” to the “absolute prohibition of 
the injunction statute,”290 French arose from the removal of a state court 
proceeding to the Virginia federal circuit court.291 Following removal and a 
decree for the defendant, the federal court granted an injunction against 
further proceedings by the losing party either in the Virginia or 
Pennsylvania state courts (where the plaintiff had sued to enforce the 
 
injunction shall not be granted ‘to stay proceedings in any court of a State.’ In the case of Diggs v. 
Wolcott, the decree of the Circuit Court had enjoined the defendant from proceeding in a suit pending 
in a State court, and this court reversed the decree, because it had no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings 
in a State court.”). 
287 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 625. 
288 Professor Mayton resists the conventional explanation in an effort to preserve the viability of his 
claim that the AIA limits only the power of single Justices rather than the power of courts. See Mayton, 
supra note 5, at 332, 339–40. Mayton argued that the dismissal may have been based on the Court’s 
finding that the federal circuit lacked judicial jurisdiction over Diggs and Keith, rather than power 
under the AIA to grant a writ of injunction. Id. at 340 n.59. In support of his argument, Mayton notes 
that Diggs and Keith made such a jurisdictional argument unsuccessfully in the lower court. Id. 
Mayton’s judicial jurisdiction argument runs headlong into the fact that both Diggs and Keith 
invoked the jurisdiction of the Connecticut state court (to recover against Wolcott) and that of the 
federal circuit (by removing Wolcott’s state court anti-suit action). Such deliberate invocation of the 
jurisdiction of the Connecticut federal circuit would surely have done much to lessen the strength of any 
argument against that court’s authority to enter a decree binding Diggs and Keith. For us, then, the 
significance of Diggs lies in the Court’s refusal to confirm an injunction that apparently fell squarely 
within the terms of the AIA’s prohibition against federal interference. 
289 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 238 (1874). 
290 Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1173. 
291 French, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 250. 
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Virginia state court’s judgment).292 The plaintiff invoked the AIA, but the 
Court rejected its application.293 
The French decision appears to reflect a conclusion that the relief in 
question was ancillary in character and did not run afoul of the AIA’s 
restriction on writs of injunction brought by original bill. Early in its 
opinion, the Court explained that the federal court’s injunctive proceeding 
was “not an original one.”294 Rather, the Court explained, “[i]t is auxiliary 
and dependent in its character.”295 As a consequence, the Court found that 
the “prohibition . . . against the granting of injunctions by the courts of the 
United States touching proceedings in State courts has no application 
here.”296 The prior jurisdiction of the federal court was said to take “the 
case out of the operation of that provision.”297 While scholars have viewed 
this as ipse dixit,298 we see a clear expression of the idea that the AIA was 
meant to limit only the issuance of original writs of injunction and to leave 
a federal court free to grant injunctive relief to effectuate a decree 
involving parties otherwise properly before that court. 
CONCLUSION 
By the mid-twentieth century, the original–ancillary distinction that 
the eighteenth-century drafters had embedded in the AIA’s limiting 
reference to “writs of injunction” had disappeared from view. A variety of 
factors combined to consign the statutory distinction to “obscurity.” Law 
and equity had been merged; the original bill of injunction had given way 
to a single “civil action” that was meant to provide an all-purpose vehicle 
for the assertion of claims in federal court.299 As a result, courts of equity 
no longer routinely entertained original bills of injunction to stay 
proceedings in the courts of law pending the resolution of equitable 
defenses; such equitable defenses as fraud and mistake were available in 
the context of a single merged civil action. In short, changes in the nature 
of legal practice made a once-familiar feature of equity remote and 
inaccessible. 
These changes were complete in 1941, when Justice Frankfurter 
encountered the AIA in the well-known case of Toucey v. New York Life 
Insurance Co.300 Frankfurter was a brilliant legal theorist and a close 
 
292 Id. at 253. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 252. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 253. 
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298 See Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1173. 
299 See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (proclaiming the advent of a single, all-purpose “civil action”). The rules 
took effect in 1938. 
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student of the history of the federal court system, but he had precious little 
experience in the practice of law.301 Acting on progressive impulses,302 
Frankfurter used the opportunity presented in Toucey to rethink the AIA. 
To Frankfurter, it was obvious that the ban on writs of injunction had been 
intended, whatever the Act’s origins, as an absolute barrier to federal 
equitable interposition in pending state court proceedings. The exceptions 
that courts had developed over time were discarded; they were simply the 
product of “loose” language and a regrettable lack of judicial restraint.303 
Time, to some extent, has marched on. Congress restored the 
exceptions to the Act in a 1948 codification of the AIA that survives to this 
day and authorizes federal courts to stay state court proceedings in aid of 
their jurisdiction and to effectuate their judgments.304 But Frankfurter’s 
account continues to shape conventional understanding of the Act. The 
Court today regards the AIA as an important barrier to equitable 
interposition and treats the exceptions as subjects of narrow 
interpretation.305 While the Court neutralized the AIA to some extent in 
 
301 For a brief biography describing Frankfurter’s career as a Harvard law professor and 
progressive advocate of judicial restraint before his appointment to the bench, see NOAH FELDMAN, 
SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 10–15 (2010). 
Justice Frankfurter’s many works included a casebook on federal jurisdiction and a history of the 
Supreme Court. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(1928). 
Justice Frankfurter graduated from law school in 1906 and worked at a law firm in New York 
City for only a few months before joining the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York as 
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School in 1914. At Harvard, Justice Frankfurter specialized in administrative law, jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court’s special place in American constitutional government. For accounts, see H.N. HIRSCH, 
THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 22–41 (1981); HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: 
SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 7–13 (1960). 
302 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
(2000). Justice Frankfurter came by his distrust of equity honestly, having worked as a law professor to 
end the federal equitable role in labor disputes, see generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, 
THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1963), and having criticized the expanded federal judicial role occasioned by 
the rise of substantive due process, see generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, Exit the Kansas Court, NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 27, 1923, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS 
ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 140 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970). He also worked to subject 
federal equity to the discipline of the Erie doctrine, holding in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 
(1945), that suits brought in equity were nonetheless subject to state statutes of limitation. See Collins, 
supra note 221, at 336–43 (arguing that Justice Frankfurter “dismissed a long line of precedent that 
suggested a different view of federal equity power” and instead used Guaranty Trust as an opportunity 
to limit the use of federal equitable injunctions as “a means of suppressing labor strikes”). 
303 Toucey, 314 U.S. at 133. 
304 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). 
305 See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
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constitutional litigation,306 the doctrine of equitable restraint draws on 
Frankfurter’s conception of the Act in defining limits on federal power to 
stay pending criminal proceedings.307 
Our account of the history of the AIA calls Frankfurter’s view into 
question. The political context in which the AIA was adopted suggests that 
the Act sought to tackle an important but limited problem that the North 
Carolina litigation in Morris v. Allen had uncovered. Drawing on 
eighteenth-century chancery practice, with its distinction between original 
process for “writs of injunction” and ancillary relief to defend federal 
power, we have proposed a more nuanced sense of what the AIA meant to 
prohibit and to leave in place. The limiting textual reference to writs of 
injunction both confirms the Act’s connection to the Morris controversy 
and explains (and to some extent justifies) the judicial recognition of AIA 
exceptions in the nineteenth century. 
And yet the historical puzzle remains. Frankfurter, the great apostle of 
judicial restraint, acted to foreclose what he perceived as judge-made 
exceptions to a statute that he regarded as self-evidently absolute in its 
prohibition. Viewed from the perspective on the Act’s origins that we 
develop here, Frankfurter begins to look like something of an activist 
himself. When we revisit his Toucey opinion with a better appreciation of 
the origins of the 1793 Act, Frankfurter appears to have acted as much 
from a distrust of federal equity as from a desire to honor the intentions of 
Congress. Dissenting in Toucey, Justice Reed gave voice to a concern with 
Justice Frankfurter’s headlong decision to end the relitigation exception. 
Reed explained “that courts of equity had long exercised the power to 
entertain bills to carry their decrees into execution by injunction against the 
parties.”308 He could not believe that Congress would draft a statute in 
which “[s]uch needed powers would . . . be lightly withdrawn.”309 We find 
it striking that the powers to which Justice Reed referred were the very 
ones Congress restored to the statute in 1948.310 We find it all the more 
striking that they had been hiding in plain sight all along, in the language of 
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